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In Mitigation of Illegality:
The U.S. Invasion of Panama
BY ALAN BERMAN*

INTRODUCTION

On December 20, 1989, the United States of America invaded
Panama in what was labelled by U.S. policymakers as "Operation
Just Cause." Twenty-six American and at least 700 Panamanian
lives were lost in the action, and an incalculable amount of property
damage was sustained.' Almost simultaneous to the invasion, the
U.S. launched an impressive effort to justify its actions. The U.S.
action against Panama raises four categories of issues:
1. Was the action lawful?
2. What effect did the law have on U.S. policy toward Panama
and on the decision to resort to military force?
3. Can the invasion be justified by mitigating circumstances
even if it is unlawful?
4. What are the consequences for the international legal order?
This Article traces the historical involvement of the U.S. in
Panama and sketches the factual circumstances leading to the U.S.
invasion of Panama. The illegality of each of the justifications
proffered by the U.S. is demonstrated. 2 The extent to which the
law affected the shaping of U.S. objectives in Panama, the process
by which the U.S. sought to achieve those objectives, and the
manner in which the U.S. tried to legitimize its action are dis-

* Lecturer in Law, Massey Umversity, New Zealand. B.A. 1979, J.D. 1983, Duke

University; L.L.M. 1991, Victoria Umversity, Wellington, New Zealand. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and suggestions made on earlier drafts of tls
Article by Professor Sir Kenneth J. Kieth and Dr. Andrew S. Ladley of Victona Umversity

School of Law, Wellington, New Zealand.
Estimates of the actual number of Panamaman casualties have ranged from 700 to
2000. How the Invasion of PanamaAffects InternationalLaw and the Bahamas, Sears, 203
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1990, at 1, col. I; Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in

Panama Under InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J.
2
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L. 494, 497 (1990).

See infra notes 44-167 and accompanying text.
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cussed.3 The reasons for, and the success of, U.S. efforts to justify
its unlawful action, or at least temper the reaction of the international community by emphasizing Nonega's drug trafficking activ4
ities and interference with democratic processes, are also examined.
The manner in which preventative law and the framing of U.S.
goals could have averted the unlawful U.S. action is canvassed.Finally, this Article addresses the implications of the U.S. action
for the international legal order.
I.

U.S. INTERVENTIONISM

The United States has a well-chromcled record of pursuing an
interventionist policy in Central America and the Caribbean. During the early nineteenth century, the U.S. policy of intervention in
the region arose from a perceived need to defend the security
interests of the continental United States. Interference by European
powers in Central America was regarded as potentially injurious
to U.S. security interests. The Monroe Doctrine was the product
of this concern. Pursuant to the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. initially
sought to protect the Americas against colonization by Europe. 6
The Monroe Doctrine was later transformed into a policy of outright U.S. military intervention, unprovoked by European inter7
meddling.
The exertion of influence over countries in the Americas and
the willingness to intervene to maintain that influence is clearly
shown in the historical involvement of the U.S. in Panama, a
country that gained its independence precisely because of U.S.
military intervention.
Until 1903, Panama was a part of Colombia. When the Senate
of Colombia failed to ratify a treaty that would have enabled the

See infra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
In 1823, U.S. President Monroe proclaimed that the U.S. had a special interest in
the Western hemisphere. He also announced a deternmnation to exclude European influence
and interference in the Western hemisphere. D. ARmSTRONG, THE RISE OF THE INTERNATONAL ORGANIZATION: A SHORT HISTORY 98 (1982); A. THOMAS, NON-INTERvNTn-THE
LAw AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AimicAS 30, 52-53 (1956).
In 1905 President Roosevelt modified the Monroe Doctrine by declaring a right of
unilateral intervention in Latin America to maintain order. A. THoMAs, supra note 6, at
30, 52-53. U.S. interventiomsm produced severe strains in relations with countries in the
Americas, many of which resented U.S. dominance in the region and the resulting political
and economic dependence such dominance fostered. E. HOYT, LAW AND FORCE IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 230 (1985).
4
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United States to build a canal across the isthmus of Panama, a
revolution was launched by a group of Colombians led by Frenchman Phillipe Bunau-Varilla. The group seized Colombian governmental facilities and declared Panama's independence. The United
States prevented Colombian forces from landing on the isthmus to
suppress the insurrection. Several days later, the U.S. recognized
Panama despite an 1846 U.S.-Colombian treaty that obligated the
U.S. to guarantee Colombian sovereignty over the isthmus of Panama. 8 Although historians continue to debate what role, if any,
the U.S. played in the 1903 revolution, Sol M. Linowitz, Senior
U.S. Adviser to the 1977 Panama Canal negotiations, confirmed
that the 1903 revolution occurred with the "knowledge, if not the
acqmescence of the U.S." 9
A new treaty was signed with Panama in November of 1903.
The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty [hereinafter the 1903 Treaty] 10 was
embarrassingly favorable to the U.S. 1 Under Article III of the
1903 Treaty, Panama ceded to the U.S. rights "in perpetuity" to
construct a canal ten miles wide, over which the U.S. would
exercise rights, powers, and authority as "if it were the sovereign
.. to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of
Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority. 1' 2 In

8 The Biolack-Mallanno Treaty exchanged U.S. guanantees of sovereignty for free
U.S. citizen transit across the isthmus. See D. KrTCHEL, THE TRUTH ABoUT THE P AA
CANAL 47 (1978).
9 Address by S. Linowitz, Why a New PanamaCanal Treaty?, The American Legion
Convention (Aug. 19, 1977), reprinted in 77 DEP'T STATE Bum. no. 1999, 520-21 (Oct. 17,
1977) [hereinafter Lmowitz Address]. After the 1903 revolt, President Theodore Roosevelt
proclaimed that Panama "rose literally as one man." A cynical U.S. senator remarked
"Yes, and the one man was Roosevelt." President Roosevelt advocated a big-stick policy:
"Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far." CmTER FOR STRATEOIC STuDnrs,
GEo. UNiv. Panama CanalIssues and Treaty Talks 8-10 (1967) [hereinafter Panama Canal
Issues]; Bell, The President, the Congress and the Panama Canal: An Essay on the Powers
of the Executive and Legislative Branches in the Field of Foreign Affairs, 16 GA. J. INT'L
& Comp. L. 607, 611-12; L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, § A, at 7, col. 1.
10The 1903 Treaty was actually drafted by Frenchman Phillipe Bunau-Varilla, who
was a stockholder in a bankrupt French Canal company, which was unable to build the
canal. The company sought to recover some of the losses suffered by persuading the U.S.
to purchase its construction rights. See G. MoFssii, THE Ln=mS oF VICTORY-THE RATIFICATiONF Tm PANAMA CANAL TRATis 21 (1985); Panama Canal: The New Treaties,
Dept. of State Publication No. 8924, 4 (Inter-Amencan Series 114) (1977) [hereinafter New
Treaties].
" Bunau-Varilla included m the treaty terms overwhelmingly favorable to the U.S. to
ensure U.S. Senate ratification. G. MomFr, supra note 10, at 23.
2 G. Mosmrr, supra note 10, at 22. The grant of jurisdictional rights in perpetuity
within the 10 mile wide strip of territory ("the Canal Zone") was not well received by the
provisional government of Panama, which sought to avoid entering into any agreement
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exchange for these concessions, the U.S. agreed to pay Panama a

token annuity."
The successful construction of the Canalrepresented a remarkable feat in Am' ican engineering. The process by which the 1903
Treaty was secured and the extremely unfavorable provisions to

pride and
Panama constituted a recipe for injured Panamanian
4

dignity as well as future Panamanian resentment.'
The unfairness of the 1903 Treaty gave rise to occasional epi-

sodes of Anti-American riots.' 5 Tension between Panama and the
U.S. reached a lugh point in 1964 when riots broke out after the
U.S. agreed to-recogmze the residual sovereignty of Panama over
the Canal by allowing the Panamanian flag to be flown in the
6

Canal Zone.'
The Government of Panama temporarily suspended diplomatic
relations with the U.S. by recalling its Ambassador from Washington. Three months later, the two countries agreed to reestablish

normal diplomatic contacts and to resolve their differences by
reaching a "just and fair agreement which would be subject to the
constitutional process of each country

",17

Negotiations between the two countries ensued for thirteen
years' s and culminated in the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties
infringing upon the territonal sovereignty of Panama. Nonetheless, the newly independent
state was virtually coerced to ratify the treaty by Bunau-Varilla, who employed alarmist
tactics, including a waring that the U.S. would disavow its protection of Panama.
Even U.S. Treaty Negotiator and Secretary of State John Hay acknowledged in a letter
to a Senator in 1904 that "the treaty was very advantageous to the U.S., and we must
you and I know
confess, with what we can muster, not so advantageous to Panama
too well how many points there are in this treaty to which a Panamanian patriot could
object." Id., New Treaties, supra note 10, at 5; Panama Canal Issues, supra note 9, at
813.
" Bell, supra note 9, at 611.
14 New Treaties, supra note 10, at 5; Linowitz Address, supra note 9, at 2-3; G.
Mo TT, supra note 10, at 20.
11For example, on Panamaman Independence Day in 1958, the U.S. flag was desecrated in the Canal Zone and U.S. citizens were attacked. PanamaCanal Issues, supra note
9, at 15-20.
16 Outraged by the flag agreement, American citizens living in the Canal Zone unsuccessfully challenged the agreement in U.S. Federal Court. See Doyle v. Fleming, 219 F
Supp. 277 (D.C.C.Z. 1963). Subsequently, the Governor of the Canal Zone decreed that
neither the U.S. nor the Panamanian flag would be flown at the four high schools in the
Canal Zone. Resisting the decree, American students at Balboa High School raised the
American flag. This, m turn, led to a series of riots as Panamanian students attempted to
raise their own flag in the Canal Zone. Over twenty persons were killed in the clashes, and
in excess of two million dollars in property damage was sustained. G. MoFrr, supra note
10, at 28, 33-40; Bell, supra note 9, at 614-17.
1 Bell, supra note 9, at 614.
18 A Gallup poll commissioned after the 1964 flag riots found that among the 64%
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in 1977 19 The Panama Canal Treaty provides for the gradual
transfer of the management and operation of the Canal to Panama
by the year 2000. The Canal Zone will cease to exist, and Panama
will assume general territorial jurisdiction over the Canal. The U.S.
retains primary responsibility for the operation and defense of the

Canal until the year 2000. The Neutrality Treaty obligates the U.S.
and Panama to maintain the neutrality of the Canal to ensure that
it remains open to vessels of all nations without discrimination."
The U.S. Senate ratified the Treaties in 1978.21 The ratification
of the Treaties was greeted with virtually unanimous international
approval. Latin American countries hoped the new treaties signalled an end to gunboat diplomacy and American imperialism. 22
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This section explains how Panama's de facto leader Manuel
Noriega incurred the wrath of the Bush and Reagan admimstrations. Additionally, the means employed by the U.S. to remove

Nonega from power are discussed. 32
of the U.S. population familiar with the issue, opposition to relinquishing control of the
Canal was favored by a margin of six to one. G. Mopi'ar, supra note 10, at 44.
11Though no reference was made to the actual text of the Treaties, a poll taken in
1977, prior to the U.S. Senate ratification debate, showed opposition to the Treaty among
78% of those familiar with the issue. Ronald Reagan focused national attention on the
Canal dunng the 1976 presidential pnmanes when he proclaimed, "We built it, we paid
for it, it's ours." Reagan's proclamation encapsulated the sentiments of many Americans
whose frustrated nationalism, resulting from the retreat of America's preemnent power in
the world after the Vietnam War, found expression in demands for the U.S. to maintain
control over the Canal. The Canal represented a symbol "of a time when
[Americans]
did pretty much as
[they] pleased." G. MorrarT, supra note 10, at 11-12, 45.
2 See Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, art. I(2)(3) 33
U.S.T. ,, T.I.A.S. No. 10030, at -,
Panama Canal Permanent Neutrality
Operation Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States Panama, art. IV, 33 U.S.T.
T.I.A.S. No. 10029, at
21 Given the tremendous lack of public support for the Treaty, the Carter Admimstration launched a major public relations offensive to persuade lawmakers of the wisdom
of the Treaties. Garnering sufficient support in the U.S. Senate for ratification was an
uphill battle but was ultimately successful. Former Attorney General Griffin Bell provides
a fascinating account of the ratification debate in the U.S. Senate and examines the
constitutional issues raised by President Carter's negotiation of the treaties (e.g., whether
the President and the Senate possess the power to make a treaty disposing of territory or
property belonging to the U.S. without an Act of Congress). See Bell, supra note 9; see
also G. Moimn=, supra note 10, at 72-103.
2 L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, § B, at 6, col. 1.
2 This information provides a useful basis for the discussion in section IV regarding
how the framing of U.S. objectives in Panama (i.e., securing the removal of Nonega from
power) was likely to lead to the unlawful action and ultimately lessened the influence of,
the law on the means chosen by the U.S. to achieve its objectives.
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When the Treaties were ratified, Omar Torrijos was the ruler

of Panama.2 In 1981, Torrijos died in a mysterious plane crash.
His intelligence cluef, Manuel Antonio Noriega, gradually assumed

control of the armed forces and emerged as de facto leader. 2

Noriega's work with the C.I.A. guaranteed the support of
several U.S. admmstrations. The Reagan adminstration initially
chose to cast a blind eye toward accusations of drug trafficking
by Nonega. 26 But U.S. support of Nonega became increasingly
difficult as allegations of election fraud, drug trafficking, and
murder of opponents gained promnnence. 27 More significantly, No-

riega lost favor with the Reagan administration when hIs duplicitous conduct toward the U.S. was discovered. While Nonega allowed
U.S. backed Contras to train in Panama, he also allegedly provided
2
arms to the Sandinistas and rebels in Colombia and El Salvador. 8

lugh technology
Noriega allegedly assisted the Cubans in obtaining
29
equipment for supply to the Soviet bloc.

The Reagan administration apparently decided Nonega had to
be removed from power. In late 1987, the Reagan adnimistration
began portraying Nonega as "a cocaine and steroid dealer who

tortures and kills his enemes, has a craving for teenage girls and
pals around with Colombian cartel goons. And he is ugly: a Quad"30
dafi magnified, an Ayatollah with horns.

' Torrijos seized power in a 1968 coup and ruled Panama as a dictator. G. Moi'rr,
supra note 10, at 29.
21 Some allege Nonega was involved in the death of Torrijos. Prior to his ascension
to power, Nonega had ties to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. As early as the 1950's,
Nonega was reportedly providing information to the U.S. about his colleagues at a military
academy in Panama. Nonega later became a paid C.I.A. informant, assisting in U.S.
mtelligence-gathenng in Latin Amenca, particularly activities in Cuba. Nonega reportedly
earned as much as $200,000 per year. It will probably take years to fully ascertain the
nature and extent of Nonega's involvement with the C.I.A. The C.I.A. is likely to withhold
potentially explosive information on its dealings with Noriega. Even the prosecutors working
on the Nonega case in Florida have not been permitted to review the C.I.A. files on
Nonega. Lacayo, Noriega on Ice, TnmE, Jan. 15, 1990, at 24; Washington Post, Dec. 21,
1989, § A, at 36, col. 4.
2 As late as 1987, the Reagan admimstration was asserting that Nonega had been
"fully cooperative" with U.S. anti-drug efforts. Nonega received more awards from the
Drug Enforcement Agency ("D.E.A.") than any other Latin leader. The D.E.A. continued
to publicly defend Nonega while it procured evidence leading to his indictment. Church,
The Devil They Knew, Tim, Jan. 15, 1990, at 28; L.A. Times, Dec. 22, 1989, § A, at 39,
col. 2.
27 Church, supra note 26, at 28.
28 Id.
29 Id.
'"

Id.
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In February 1988, Nonega was indicted by a U.S. Federal
Grand Jury in Florida for drug-trafficking and conspiracy to import large quantities of marijuana. As a result of the drug mdictments, on February 25, 1988 President Del Valle of Panama
dismissed Nonega from his post as Commander of the Panamaman
Defense Forces [hereinafter P.D.F.]. The following day, President
Del Valle was impeached during a session of the National Assembly
3 1
dominated by Nonega sympathizers.
The U.S. sought to negotiate Noriega's surrender of power by
offering him asylum in a European country Nonega refused the
offer. 32 Economic sanctions instituted by the Reagan administration
in March 1988 also failed to achieve Nonega's surrender.3 3 Continued mediation efforts by both Latin American leaders and the
Organization of American States [hereinafter O.A.S.] also failed
to secure Nonega's departure from power. The propaganda disseminated by the U.S. about Nonega forced the U.S. into a corner.
One journalist commented:
"The U.S. through two Administrations built Nonega into a
menacing monster-instead of what he was, the tin-pot dictator
of a not very important country-and put its credibility on the
line by declaring he had to go. But everything Washington tried
34
failed."
In May 1989, Panama held national elections, which most
foreign observers agreed the opposition won decisively The Noriega government annulled the election results, alleging outside
interference. A pro-Nonega group called the Dignity Battalions

3' De Valle was replaced by Education Minister Manual Solis Palma. The U.S.
continued to recognize De Valle as Panama's lawful President until his term expired on
August 31, 1989. The U.S. also pressed the Nonega government to hold free and fair
elections. L. Eagleburger, The Case Against Panama'sNoriega, Address before the Panama
Council of the Organization of American States, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 31, 1989),
reprintedin Current Policy No. 1222, Amencan Foreign Policy Current Documents.
11The U.S. sought to secure Nonega's departure from power beginmng in late
February 1988 and continuing through October 1989. History of Diplomatic Efforts to
Resolve the PanamanianCrisis, STATE DEPT. Doc., no. 1815, 1-6 (Dec. 19, 1989).
31 In December 1987, the U.S. Senate barred military and economic aid to Panama.
In March 1988, President Reagan issued a declaration under the International Emergency
Powers Act, freezing Panamanian government assets in the U.S. and bamng payments to
the Nonega regime of funds by U.S. citizens and compames. Approximately $300 million
in payments were placed in escrow. Eagleburger, supra note 24, at 5-6.
14 Church, Showing Muscle, Tavm, Jan. 1, 1990, at 23.
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attacked opposition leaders who were marching in protest of the
35
annulment of the election.
In October 1989, rebel troops within the P.D.F launched an
unsuccessful coup that had the blessing, if not the actual logistical
support, of the

U.S.36

After the coup attempt, tension between the

U.S. and Panama escalated. The U.S. intensified its verbal attacks
on Noriega, thereby further painting itself into a corner. In an
August 31, 1989 address before the O.A.S., Deputy U.S. Secretary
of State Eagleburger targeted Nonega as the primary factor responsible for the political crisis in Panama and the strained relations with the U.S..
Nothing would please my government or the American people
more than to end the measures currently in place and to reestablish normal relations with a democratic Panama. There is
only one obstacle to resolving this crisis and we know who it is
the problem is Nonega and, specifically, Noriega's willingness to put his personal interests and his personal gain above his
colleagues in the Panama Defense Force, above his country, and
above the international community in this hemisphere and the
world.
Noriega's greed, personal ambition, and selfishness are the
origin, core, and sustenance of Panama's crisis. So long as he
and those around him fail to recognize that reality, attempting
to disguise it or deflect responsibility for it to others, the crisis
will only worsen.
In Panama the regime is aiding-giving refuge to-the narcotics traffickers, their front businesses, and the banks through
which they launder their dirty money
The writing is on the wall. The pattern is clear. Indifference
to the voluminous evidence can only give license and encouragement to Noriega and his kind.
The evasions, the postunngs, the propaganda parading as
truth-all that Nonega's defenders have put forward to keep this
criminal in power have been exposed. Noriega's actions
are
inexcusable.
But our inaction would be inexcusable. This is no time for
silence. This is no time for timidity We must see Noriega for
who he is.
" The Organization of American States condemned "the grave events and the abuses
by General Manuel Antonio Nonega in the crisis and the electoral process in Panama."
The Case Against Panama'sNoriega, supra note 31, at 5; Smolowe, Panama's Would-Be
President, TwE, Jan. 1,1990, at 30.

- L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 1989, § A, at 7, col. 4.
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Columbia and Panama. Barco and Nonega. Could we have
a starker comparison of the moral qualities of the best and worst
among us in our hemisphere? Which one deserves our help; which
one deserves to be purged, to be driven from our midst? For the
States, at least, the answer is clear. Barco si, Noriega
United
37
No!

On December 15, 1989, the Nonega controlled Panamanian
National Assembly passed a resolution declaring the country to be
the U.S. as long as U.S. economic sanctions
in a state of war with
31
place.
in
remained
On December 16, 1989, a U.S. Marine was shot and killed by
a member of the P.D.F 39 In a separate incident on the same day,
a Navy lieutenant and his wife'were near the P.D.F headquarters
when they were taken to an undisclosed location by intoxicated
P.D.F. soldiers and interrogated for four hours. The lieutenant
allegedly was kicked and his wife threatened with rape. 4°
On December 20, 1989, the U.S. launched a full scale invasion
of Panama and effectively toppled the Nonega regime. The same
day, the freely elected leaders of Panama, President Endara and
Vice Presidents Calderon and Ford assumed the leadership of
Panama.
The U.S. invasion resulted in the loss of twenty-six American
and at least 700 Panamanian lives and a tremendous amount of
property damage. 41 U.S. invasion forces remained in Panama for
over one month after the invasion. 42
After seeking refuge m the Vatican Embassy in Panama City
for over a week, Nonega left the embassy compound and was
apprehended by U.S. authorities for a trial on drug-trafficking
charges in the United 3 States. Nonega is currently in custody in
4
Florida awaiting trial.

The Case Against Panama'sNorega, supra note 31, at 6.
One journalist has suggested that Nonega's declaration of war was designed to
consolidate his shrinking base of popular support and revive his beleaguered 16,000 member
armed forces. Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1989, § A, at 33, col. 1.
WEE LY, Dec. 24,
39 U.S. Officer Killed After Panama Declares War, GuoARum
1989, at 15; L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, § B, at 31, col. 1; Washington Post, Dec. 21,
1989, § A, at 31, col. I.
40 Washington Post, supra note 38; Pincus, Pair of Incidents Pushed Bush Toward
Invasion, Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1989, § A, at 16, col. I [hereinafter Pairof Incidents];
Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1989, § A, at 31, col. 5; infra note 68.
4 Nanda, supra note 1, at 494.
42 Id.
43Id.
7

31
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JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE INVASION

Introduction

The Bush Adnmistration presented four justifications for the
invasion: protecting American lives, maintaining the integrity of
the Panama Canal Treaties, restoring democracy in Panama, and
bringing Nonega to justice. As a possible fifth justification, the
U.S. alleged that it had consulted with the democratically elected
leadership of Panama, who welcomed the invasion. This section
establishes the illegality of each of the justifications proffered by
the U.S. under even the most generous reading of the facts presented. It is important to understand the legal weaknesses of each
of the justifications, in order to fully appreciate the discussion in
section IV regarding the attempt by the United States to justify its
unlawful action, or at least to temper the reaction of the international community, by focusing on the context in which the U.S.
action was taken and emphasizing the drug trafficking activities of
Noriega and his interference with democratic process.
B.

The Law of HumanitarianIntervention

The U.S. asserted that its action, taken to protect American
lives, was justified under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
This section outlines the pre-U.N. Charter law on humanitarian
intervention. The great divergence of opinion among states and
legal scholars on the impact of the U.N. Charter on the law of
humamtarian intervention is discussed. The legality of the U.S.
invasion is tested under each of these varying interpretations.
Under pre-U.N. Charter customary international law, states
had the right to use force to protect their nationals abroad. However, states could only exercise this right in limited circumstances.
The position outlined by U.S. Secretary of State Danel Webster
in a diplomatic letter to the British in 1842 is commonly accepted
as reflective of the boundaries within which the use of force may
be legitimately exercised under customary international law 44 Webster stated:
" The letter was written in response to a British claim of a legal right to attack the
vessel Carolina on the American side of the Niagara River on the basis that the vessel
carried armed men intending to use force to assist an insurrection in Canada. Secretary
Webster rejected any such right under the facts presented by the British. See J. GOLDEN,
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 201 (1974); W GinsoRE, Tan GRENADA

INTERVENTION

49 (1984).
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It will be for [her Majesty's] Government to show a necessity
of self-defense, instant, overwhelrmng, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also,
that the local authorities of Canada-even supposing the necessity
of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the
United States at all-did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since
the act justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited
45
by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.
After the adoption of the U.N. Charter, Sir Humphrey Waldock
tailored Webster's test to suit circumstances involving the protection of nationals abroad:
There must be (1) an imunent threat of injury to nationals,
(2) a failure or mability on the part of the territorial sovereign
to protect them and (3) measures of protection strictly confined
to the object of protecting them against injury Even under
customary law only an absolute necessity could justify an intervention to protect nationals. 6
There is some dispute as to whether the customary international
law right of self-defense to protect nationals abroad survives the
U.N. Charter. The United Nations Charter exhorts member states
to settle all disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the
use of force in their relations with other states. The general prohibition on the use of force is contained in article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, which states the following:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 47
The broad prohibition on the use of force is subject to two
explicit exceptions: individual or collective self-defense, and armed
action by the U.N. Security Council as an enforcement measure.4

"Excerpts reprinted in W GiumoR., supra note 44, at 49.
E. HoYT, LAW AND FOREIGN PouIcY 216-17 (1985). States asserting a right of
humanitarian intervention have in some cases relied upon Webster's general test of the
customary international law right of self-defense and in other instances upon the criteria
set forth by Sir Humphrey Waldock. For example, during the Security Council debates on
the Entebbe raid, Israel stated that its action complied with Webster's test. "The U.S. on
the other hand, relied on Sir Humphrey Waldock's formula in defending the Israeli action.
See infra notes 59, 66.
47 U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
48 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51; Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force,
82 MicH. L. REv. 1620, 1620 (1984).
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The use of force in individual or collective self-defense is allowed under article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which states in relevant
part,
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
49
peace.
There is a great divergence of opinion among states and legal
scholars on the exact meaning and application of article 51 of the

U.N. Charter. Most states and some commentators reason that the
qualifying words, "if an armed attack occurs," strictly limits the
right of self-defense to instances where a prior armed attack against
the geographical territory of the State has occurred.50 Under this

interpretation, the customary international law right of self-defense
to protect nationals abroad does not survive the U.N. Charter, 5'
and the use of force by a state to protect its nationals abroad is
prohibited by article 51 . 52 Other states and some commentators
maintain that the use of the word "inherent" in article 51 recognizes and preserves the pre-U.N. Charter customary international
law right of self-defense to protect one's nationals abroad.5 3 The

49 U.N. CHARTER art.

51.

10 See D'Angelo, Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The U.S. Rescue
Mission to Iran and its Legality Under InternationalLaw, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 487-490
(1981) (stating that the majority of U.N. members adopt this restrictive reading of article
51 due to a concern that the parameters of the customary international law right of selfdefense are not clearly delineated, resulting in the potential gradual erosion of all restraints
on the use of force).
11I. BROWNiH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 268 (1963);
Fairley, State Actors, HumanitarianIntervention and InternationalLaw: Reopening Pandora's Box, 10 GA. J. INT'L L. 29, 33 (1980).
52 T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, WORLD POITICS: VERBAL STRATEGY AMONG THE
SUPERPowERs 75 (1971); J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDm: A CRmQuE OF UNnED
NATONs THE RiEs OF AGGREssiON 41 (1958); D'Angelo, supra note 50, at 490-93, 496, 517.
11 A third group of commentators, such as Lillich and Moore, contend that the preCharter customary international law right of self-defense is activated only if the Security
Council is unsuccessful in resolving the dispute. Both of these legal scholars have set forth
a number of factors to be considered in assessing the lawfulness of particular armed action
to protect nationals abroad. These factors extend beyond the three criteria laid down by
Sir Humphrey Waldock in establishing the parameters within which forcible armed intervention may be legitimately exercised to rescue nationals under customary international law.
See Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REv 325,
349-51 (1967); Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J.
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two interpretations of article 51 reflect different policy considerations. 54 The remarks made by various states during the Security
Council debates on the 1976 Israeli raid on Entebbe illustrate the
policy considerations underlying the various interpretations.
In theory, the doctrine of intervention to protect nationals
abroad is appealing because it enables states to take action to
protect their nationals and not have to stand by idly and witness
the murder of their citizens in foreign countries.5 5 In defending the
raid on Entebbe to rescue Israeli nationals taken hostage by international terrorists, the Israeli representative to the Security Council
asserted that the customary international law right of self-defense
to protect nationals survived the U.N. Charter. He also made an
impassioned plea for the need to recognize human freedom over
national sovereigntyHad a Jewish state existed in the 1930's, we might well have
decided, with the rise of Nazism, to endeavour to undertake an
operation to rescue the inmates of the concentration camps. The

INT'L L. 205, 262-64 (1969).

The United States, Great Britain, Israel, and Belgium contend that the customary right
of self-defense to protect its nationals abroad survived the U.N. Charter. In the Nicaragua
case, the International Court of Justice [hereinafter ICJ] had occasion to consider the status
of the customary international law right of self-defense vis a vis the U.N. Charter. Iroically,
in the Nicaragua case, the U.S. adopted a view apparently at variance with its usual position
that the customary international law right of self-defense survived the U.N. Charter. The
U.S. requested the Court to refrain from applying the rules of customary international law
to its dispute with Nicaragua because these rules have been subsumed and supervened
principally by the U.N. Charter. The ICJ held that the customary international law right
of self-defense coexists with the U.N. Charter:
Article 51 bf the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a
'natural' or 'inherent' right of self-defense, and it is hard to see how this can
be other than of a customary nature, even if its present content has been
confirmed and influenced by the Charter. Moreover, the Charter, having itself
recognized the existence of this right, does not go on to regulate directly all
aspects of its content. For example, it does not contain any specific rule
whereby self-defense would warrant only measures which are proportional to
the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in
customary international law. Moreover, a definition of armed attack which,
if found to exist, authorizes the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense,
is not provided in the Charter, and is not part of treaty law.
Although the ICJ recognized that the customary international law right of self-defense
coexists with the U.N. Charter, the court specifically expressed no view on the lawfulness
of an armed response to the imminent threat of an armed attack because the issue was not
raised by the parties to the Nicaragua case. D'Angelo, supra note 50, at 498; Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (U.S. v. Nicaragua) 1986
I.C.J. 17-18, 84 (June 27, 1986).
s, D'Angelo, supra note 50, at 486-500.
' See Lillich, supra note 53, at 344.
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logic of those who criticize us today would maintain that by so
doing we would be in flagrant violation of the national sovereignty of the Third Reich. What would have been more important: Hitler's sovereignty or rescuing innocent people from a
6
holocaust?1
Some states have and will continue to rely upon the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention to justify armed action allegedly designed to protect their nationals abroad. For this reason, some
commentators suggest that the international rules regulating the
use of force should reflect the practice of states. Jean Raby argues
forcefully for a legal regime permitting the use of force to protect
nationals abroad:
[I]n the end the overriding concern is to bring international
law closer to the reality of the international community
It cannot be demed that states do use force to protect nationals; and that they do it because they have no other choice.
This is not to say that prohibition of the use of force in Article
2(4) of the Charter is a dead letter. It must be recognized,
however, that the whole system of regulation of the use of force
set up by the Charter is shaky. Maintaining an idealistic vision
of a contemporary world ruled by a legal order prohibiting all
unilateral recourse to forceful coercion will not restore its strength.
International law can play a crucial role in fulfillment of the
objective of peace and harmony between nations, by setting up
rules that represent ways to attain it. One does not, however,
strengthen the international legal order by establishing rules whose
content is so abstract that they become mere ideals, ideals to
which states will pay lipservice but which do not take into account
the behavior of the international community By maintaining that
a unilateral use of force is prohibited, the Charter system and
the whole body of international law is and will be brought into

dispute.

57

International law, and the international community in general, will be better served by a legal regime of the use of force
that allows for unilateral use of armed coercion m certain welldefined exceptional situations. This regime would correspond more
to the present needs of the international community and would
enhance respect for the rule of law 58

31 U.N. SCOR (1939th mtg.) at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV 1939 (1976).
'

Raby, The State of Necessity and the Use of Force to Protect Nationals, 1988

CANADIAN YRBK. INT'L L. 253, 271.
58 Id. (quoting J. STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS

36-37).
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Creating a legal regime that reflects the practice of states, as
Raby suggests, could result in the eventual disintegration of the
general prohibition on the use of force. Each justification, if
proffered consistently over a period of time, would theoretically,
according to Raby's reasoning, be reflected in the international
rules regulating the use of force. Over time, so many exceptions
to Article 2(4) could be created that the exceptions could become
the rules and the rule the exception. Expressing just such a concern,
the Tanzanian Representative implied in his remarks to the U.N.
Security Council that upholding the rule of law was more important
than recognizing exceptions that would serve only to weaken the
purpose of the rule-maintaining peace:
If we condone lawlessness and disrespect for all that the
international community has held so dear, we shall be saying that
the Charter and what it stands for does not mean much. We
shall, in fact, be saying that we can always make exceptions
depending on how circumstances suit our own interests.
The Israeli military action at Entebbe cannot be taken lightly
It is a dangerous precedent which, if allowed to go uncontested,
could usher in a new era in mternational relations, an era of
lawlessness.
We must
speak against the danger of allowing
a precedent of this nature to go uncontested. We must speak in
such terms because either we have international law we all respect,
either we have a
U.N. [Charter] to which we all adhere, or
we do not. If you make one exception, then exceptions become
the rule.5 9
Some states, unwilling to support the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, have noted that a rescue mission may cause chaos
and destruction and result in the loss of the very lives the mission
was designed to save. These factors were cited by the representatives of several states during the Security Council debates on Entebbe. More than one hundred officers and men of the Ugandan
army were killed during the Israeli raid on Entebbe as were several
Israeli hostages. In addition, some Ugandan military and civilian
aircraft were destroyed. 60 The Tanzanian representative stated,

5931 U.N. SCOR (1941st mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV 1941 (1976) [hereinafter U.N.
Doc. S/PV 1941].
- 31 U.N. SCOR (1939th mtg.) at 23, U.N. Doc. S/PV 1939 (1976) [hereinafter U.N.
Doc. S/PV 1939]. Several of the delegations discounted the significance of the loss in
Ugandan military personnel and aircraft because there was some evidence to suggest that
Uganda's leader Idi Amin had collaborated with the terrorists.
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[I]f we are determined to save hostages from hijackers-a
determination we all share-we must equally be concerned at the
senseless loss of life inflicted upon the Ugandans. And not only
upon the Ugandans. In a sense, the Israeli action also led to the
killing of some of the very hostages the Israeli government at-

tempted to save.

61

There is tension between the factors that favor a right of
humanitarian intervention and the factors that argue against such
a right. The Representative from Great Britain explained the dilemma posed by these conflicting considerations:
[The] debate.
involves questions that affect us all. On the
one hand, there is the principle of territorial integrity; on the
other hand, there is the equally valid consideration that States
exist for the protection of their peoples, and they have the right,
perhaps, the duty, to exercise that right
The different positions concering the impact of the U.N.
Charter on the customary international law right of self-defense to
protect nationals reflect the relative weight placed on competing
policy considerations. These conflicting considerations are not easily resolved. The U.S. invasion of Panama is unlawful under both
restrictive and expansive interpretations of article 51 and tends to
prove the risks associated with recognizing a right of humanitarian
intervention under the U.N. Charter
1. Protecting U.S. Nationals in Panama
The facts relied upon by the U.S. to justify its action as a
measure designed to protect American lives, as well as the actual
circumstances of the invasion, fail to comply with even an expansive reading of article 51. No imminent threat to U.S. nationals in
Panama existed, and the military actions were not strictly confined
to removing U.S. nationals from danger.
In a December 20th address to the nation, President Bush
outlined the facts allegedly justifying the U.S. action to protect its
nationals in Panama:
Last Friday, Nonega declared his military dictatorship to be
in a state of war with the United States and publicly threatened
the lives of Americans in Panama. The very next day, forces

61

U.N. Doc. S/PV 1941, supra note 59.
U.N. Doc. S/PV 1939, supra note 56, at 13.
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under his command shot and killed an unarmed American serviceman, wounded another, arrested and brutally beat a third
American serviceman, and then brutally interrogated his wife,
threatemng her with sexual abuse.
That was enough.
General Noriega's reckless threats and attacks upon Amencans in Panama created an imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama.
I took this action only after reaching the conclusion that
every other avenue was closed and the lives of American citizens
6
were in grave danger.

To bolster U.S. claims that the lives of Americans were in
imminent danger, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker alluded to
the existence of an unsubstantiated intelligence report about a
planned attack on American citizens:
[A]fter the President had made his decision he received an
intelligence report that General Nonega was considering launching

an urban commando attack on American citizens in a residential

63 Press Statement by President George Bush (Dec. 20, 1989). There is some uncertainty surrounding the factual claims made by President Bush. For example, the precise
circumstances of the incident involving the shooting of the American manne are m dispute.
The U.S. asserted that four off-duty U.S. officers were driving when they made a wrong
turn and found themselves in front of the headquarters of the P.D.F They were allegedly
forced to stop the car by approximately 40 civilians and 5 or 6 uniformed P.D.F soldiers.
The crowd tried to pull the Americans out of the car, whereupon the servicemen drove off.
Shots were fired at the fleeing car killing one American.
Panamaman sources claimed the 4 men broke through P.D.F checkpoints and opened
fire on Nonega's headquarters, wounding 3 Panamaians. One of the allegedly wounded
Panamaians later confirmed he was shot by a stray bullet near P.D.F headquarters. The
grandmother of one of the other civilians allegedly wounded stated that her grand-daughter
was actually hit by a stray bullet 4 miles away from P.D.F headquarters. GUARDAN
WEEKLY, supra note 39.
U.S. officials in Panama stated that the American serviceman who was beaten and
whose wife was threatened was not available for an interview. President Bush failed to
mention that a Panamanian policeman was also wounded by a U.S. lieutenant on December
16, 1989. The U.S. officer was leaving a laundry near the headquarters of the U.S. Southern
Military Command when he was approached by a uniformed Panamanian who signalled
the serviceman to stop and then approached him. Feeling threatened, the serviceman reached
for his gun and fired two shots. The U.S. Pentagon acknowledged that the lieutenant was
in civilian clothes and was not authorized to carry a weapon. Pineus, supra note 40; see
also Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1989, § A, at 16, col. 4; Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1989,
§ A, at 32, col. 1. Understandably, many view with suspicion legal arguments advanced by
countries because "states in substantiating their claims, frequently seem to cite carefully
chosen, if not fabricated, sets of facts. Thus, the legal justifications offered by states are
often perceived as rationalizations contrived after the decision to intervene has been made."
Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 Cm. L.R. 113, 119
(1986).
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neighborhood. I cannot prove to you that this report was absolutely reliable, but I do know that if the President had failed to
act as he did and Nonega's dignity battalions had killed and
terrorized a dozen American families in Panama, you would be
asking us today why didn't you act to prevent this kind of
violence against our citizens. 64
Baker's reference to thus unsubstantiated intelligence report
reflects one of the dilemmas faced in assessing the propriety of a
particular state's action under international law; the international
community is often confronted with an avalanche of information
or disinformation from questionable sources.A5
It is impossible to harmonize the facts relied upon by the U.S.
as well as the circumstances of the actual invasion with either a
restrictive or expansive reading of article 51. Under a restrictive
view, the U.S. invasion of Panama was clearly violative of article
51 because it was not preceded by an armed attack by the Republic
of Panama on the territory of the U.S. An expansive reading of
article 51 recognizes the pre-Charter customary international law
right of self-defense. The U.S. action cannot be reconciled with
the three conditions enumerated by Sir Humphrey Waldock and
previously accepted by the U.S. as indicative of the customary
international law right of self-defense." No imminent threat to
U.S. nationals in Panama existed. The declaration of war by the
Panamaman National Assembly was not in itself sufficient to constitute an imminent threat to the 35,000 Americans living in Panama. As Dinstem aptly points out, "The notion that mere
mobilization or 'bellicose utterances' as such may justify selfdefence within the framework of Article 51, has no foundation." 67

65

Press Conference by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, Dec. 20, 1989.
Y. DNsTaEn, WAR, AGoREssioN AND SELF-DEFENSE 177 (1988).
In defending the legality of the Israeli rescue mission at Entebbe, U.S. ambassador

Scranton reiterated the three conditions enumerated by Sir Humphrey Waldock:
Israel's action m rescuing hostages necessarily involved a temporary breach
of the territorial integrity of Uganda. Normally, such a breach would be

impermissible under the Charter of the U.N. However, [t]here is a wellestablished right to use limited force for the protection of one's own nationals

from an imminent threat of injury or death in a situation where the state in
whose territory they are located is either unwilling or unable to protect them.
The right, flowing from the right of self-defense, is limited to such use of
force as is necessary and appropriate to protect threatened nationals from
injury.
U.N. Doc. S/PV 1941, supra note 59, at 8.
67 y. DirsmN, supra note 65, at 173-74.
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The U.S. provided factual evidence on only two unrelated incidents. After the murder of the U.S. Marine, the Panamanian
military attempted to reassure the U.S. that the incident was isolated and umntended. 6 After being briefed by the Bush Adnumstration on the two incidents relied upon as justifying the U.S.
action, one member of Congress stated the following: "The December 16 incidents were the excuse and not the reason for the
69
invasion."

The U.S. action was not strictly confined to removing U.S.
citizens from danger. A massive invasion force was not necessary
to protect American lives. Indeed, the invasion had a destructive
impact on civilian population centers in Panama City 70 Furthermore, the action placed Americans in Panama in greater peril than
they had been prior to the invasion, as is reflected in the number
of casualties.71 A less intrusive alternative could have been chosen,
such as the evacuation of Americans on the isthmus to U.S. military bases. Such an option would have represented a more proportional response 72to the isolated incidents and unsubstantiated
intelligence reports.
The U.S. action constituted an attack against the existing governmental leadership in Panama. The Endara government's representative to the U.N. affirmed that the invasion was aimed at the
Nonega regime. 73 Although a carefully circumscribed rescue mission might not violate article 2(4), a large scale invasion to protect
nationals or to overthrow a tyrannical regime violates the territorial
integrity and political independence of the State by infringing upon
the right of the state to control access to its territory and to
determine the makeup of its political leadership free from outside
interference. Even commentators who contend that the customary
international law right to protect nationals abroad survived the
U.N. Charter concede that the military operation must be carefully
" N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1989, § A, at 19, col. 5.
0 Pineus, supra note 40, at 16.
70 One

journalist asserted that residential apartment buildings sustained a great deal

of damage from Apache helicopters used during the invasion. Over 400 bombs landed on

Panama City in 13 hours. See N.Y. Times, June 18, 1990, § A, at 21, col. 5; Washington
Post, Dec. 23, 1989, § A, at 19, col. 5.

7, Security Council Resolutions declaring the use of force illegal in a given situation
note the much higher number of casualties resulting from the defense in relation to the
attack. See Schachter, supra note 48, at 1637.
7 L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, § B, at 7, col. 4.
7 44 U.N. GAOR (88th Plenary Mtg.), Doc. 7976 (1989) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
7976].
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limited to protecting nationals, not attacking the leadership of the
existing government.7 4
The purported legal justification cited by the Bush administration fails to withstand scrutiny even under an expansive reading of
article 51, recogmzing the pre-Charter customary international law
right of self-defense. The U.S. failed to establish any imminent
threat to American nationals in Panama or establish that Panama
was unable or unwilling to protect American nationals. Finally,
the invasion itself was not limited to protecting U.S. nationals.
The reaction of the international community supports the view
that the U.S. action is indefensible under article 51 of the U.N.
Charter Although the U.S., Great Britain, and France vetoed a
draft Security Council Resolution that deplored the U.S. invasion, 75
the majority of U.N. members voted in favor of a resolution
strongly deploring the intervention in Panama as a flagrant viola-

74 See Schachter, The Legality of Pro-DemocraticInvasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645,
649 (1984).
11Under the draft resolution, the Security Council would have demanded the immediate cessation of the United States intervention in Panama and the withdrawal of its forces.
The Council also would have strongly deplored the intervention as a flagrant violation of
international law and of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of States.
The Secretary-General also would have been requested to monitor developments in Panama
and to report back to the Council within 24 hours.
The representatives of Senegal, the U.S., and Colombia made statements to the Security
Council and statements in explanation of vote on the Security Council resolution were made
by representatives of Finland, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.
The representative of Senegal emphasized that states must avoid resorting to force,
and his country could not endorse an action that undermined the very foundations of
international relations. Colombia acknowledged that the de facto government of Panama
had prevented the free expression of Panamanian will. Nevertheless, Colombia deplored the
U.S. intervention on the basis that Panamanians had the right to determine their fate
without internal or external meddling.
Ten countnes voted in favor of the resolution, four against (Canada, France, United
Kingdom, and the U.S.), with one abstention (Finland).
Finland abstained because it felt a more specific reference should have been made to
the right of the Panamanian people to democracy. France opposed the draft resolution as
it was too unbalanced and might imply support for a regime that France thought illegitimate.
In France's view, a balanced resolution would have included a statement expressing regret
for the interruption of the democratic process in Panama.
The U.K. also voted against the resolution because of its unbalanced nature. The U.K
representative said the Security Council should welcome the establishment of democracy in
Panama. The draft failed to acknowledge the long history of the Nonega regime's violence
against U.S. personnel and that the U.S. used force only as a last resort.
In explaining its vote in favor of the resolution, the U.S.S.R. condemned the U.S.
invasion as a flagrant violation of international law. The Soviet representative stated that
the U.S. action gave rise to cynicism because "democracy could not be brought in on the
point of a bayonet." 44 U.N. SCOR (2902nd mtg.) at 6820-27, U.N. Doc. Sc. 5155 (1989).
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tion of international law and of the independence, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity of States.7 6 Although General Assembly Resolutions are not binding under the U.N. Charter and are often
influenced by political considerations, such decisions do express
the collective consensus of the international conmunity They may
be regarded as interpretative evidence of legal obligation, particu-

larly when states friendly to the intervemng state are convinced
that the action constitutes a violation of the U.N. Charter.77 Many
states friendly to the United States, including Barbados, Brazil,
Haiti, Australia, Colombia, and Mexico, voted in favor of the
General Assembly Resolution. 78 No member of the United Nations,
apart from the U.S., stated that the action was defensible under

article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
The U.S. intervention in Panama lends support to those who
argue that strict constructions of articles 2(4) and 51 are necessary

in order to limit the temptation to rely on humanitarian intervention as a pretext for intervention to advance other aims. As Fairley
observes, "A history of black intentions clothed in white has

76The resolution recalled article 2(4) of the Charter and reaffirmed the need to restore
conditions that would guarantee the full exercise of the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of the Panamanian people. The resolution also reaffirmed the sovereign and
inalienable right of Panama to determine freely its social, economic, and political system
and to develop its international relations without any forms of foreign intervention, interference, coercion, or threat. The resolution demanded the immediate cessation of the U.S.
intervention and the withdrawal from Panama of the armed invasion forces of the U.S.
Statements were made in the General Assembly by the representatives of China,
Mexico, Ukraine, Albania, Colombia, the U.S., and Panama. Putting aside the U.S. and
Panamaman remarks, these statements reveal that many countries discounted the justifications advanced for the invasion.
The representative from China stated that the U.S. made a mockery of sovereignty
and human rights by asserting it had intervened in Panama to restore democracy and to
defend itself. Mexico's representative stated that drug trafficking should not provoke an
action such as that undertaken by the U.S. in Panama. The Ukraine representative stated
that the U.S. action symbolized the discredited policy of "might makes right." Not surprisingly, Albania leveled perhaps the most stinging criticism against the U.S. action. The
Albaman delegate said no pretext could justify the U.S. action. He condemned the aggression
as a flagrant instance of brutal interference in an independent and sovereign state. The U.S.
action had proven once again that the super-power's expressed intention to strive for
international peace and security remains sheer rhetoric.
75 states voted in favor of the resolution, 40 abstained and 20 voted against the
resolution. U.N. Doc. 7976, supra note 73, at 6820-27.
77See Schachter, supra note 48, at 1620-22; see generally Schachter, Self Defense and
the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 261-62 (1989).
71 N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1989, § A, at 20, col. 3; U.N. Doc. 7976, supra note 73, at
6820-27.
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tainted the most possible applications of the doctrine of [humam'
taran intervention] .

79

Fairley's quote has particular relevance to the U.S. invasion of
Panama. The U.S. meticulously chose the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention to persuade other countries to accept its action. It
presented as many facts as possible in an attempt to lend credibility
to the application of the doctrine to its action. Yet, as the above
analysis has shown, the U.S. relied upon this doctrine in an attempt
to mask an intervention aimed at changing the existing governmental structure in Panama.
2. Legality Under the O.A.S. Charter
As an additional defense, the U.S. asserted that its action was
in conformity with the O.A.S. Charter. The U.S. action cannot be
defended under the O.A.S. Charter for three reasons. First, the
circumstances preceding the invasion did not impede the ability of
the U.S. to discharge its obligations under the Panama Canal
Treaty Second, even if the situation prior to the invasion did limit
the U.S.'s ability to carry out its obligations, the U.S. action was
not defensible because it was not exercised in conformity with the
U.N. Charter. Third, the U.S. action conflicts with the nomntervention principle codified in the O.A.S. Charter.
The U.S. made a conclusory assertion that the use of force in
protecting American lives in Panama was pernussible under article
21 of the O.A.S. Charter.80 "The American states bind themselves
in their international relations not to have recourse to the use of
force, except in the case of self-defense m accordance with existing
treaties or in fulfillment thereof." 8'
The right of self-defense is allowed under the O.A.S. Charter
'8 2
"in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof.
The U.S. argued that it had a right to protect its nationals performing U.S. functions under the Panama Canal treaty to enable
the U.S. to fulfill its obligations under that treaty This argument
suggests that widescale attacks against American personnel in Panama are tantamount to an attack against the U.S. if such attacks
significantly impair the ability of the U.S. to carry out its respon-

Fairley, supra note 51, at 63.
10L. Einaudi, Remarks to Organization of American States (Dec. 22, 1989) reprinted
79

in Panama: A Just Cause U.S. Dept. of State Current Policy Doc. no. 1240, 3.
8, O.A.S. CaRTER (Revised) ch. III, art. 21, para. I.
32

Id.
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sibilities under the Panama Canal Treaty. The issue would then be
under what circumstances would the U.S. be able to exercise force
in self-defense to fulfill its obligations under the Panama Canal
Treaty. Isolated incidents against American nationals in Panama
should not activate the nght to resort to the use of force in selfdefense. The attacks would have to be sufficiently widespread to
impair the ability of the U.S. to maintain, improve, protect, and
defend the Canal. Only in such circumstances could a nexus be
drawn between attacks against U.S. nationals and an attack against
the U.S. as a party striving to fulfill its obligations under the
Panama Canal Treaty.
The U.S. made no such showing. Instead, the U.S. ambassador
to the U.N., Thomas R. Pickenng, stated to the U.N. Security
Council that for two years preceding the invasion the Noriega
regime engaged in a systematic campaign to harass and intimidate
U.S. and Panamanian employees of the Panama Canal Commission."3 As factual support for this claim, the State Department
alleged in a conclusory and vague manner 300 violations of U.S.
military bases by P.D.F personnel, 400 instances of detention of
U.S. personnel, and 140 instances of endangerment to U.S. personnel.84 Yet, canal operations were never interrupted, and the
Canal was never forced to close prior to the invasion. More importantly, Michael A. Kozak, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs, made a statement on November
2, 1989, conceding that Nonega sought to avoid any direct threat
to Canal operations or the exercise of U.S. rights under the Panama
Canal Treaty:
Clearly, the political crisis in Panama which began in the
summer of 1987 has severely strained our ability to work with
Panama on matters of mutual interest, including the Canal relationship. But neither the United States nor the treaties themselves
have become the issue. Despite a constant stream of disinformation and unsubstantiated charges about U.S. treaty violations, the
regime has been careful not to attack or disown the treaties.
Despite regime efforts to change U.S. nonrecognition policy
by harassing U.S. and Panamaman employees of the U.S. forces
and the Panama Canal Commission, Noriegahas seemingly sought

3T. Pickenng,

Remarks to UN Security Council (Dec. 20, 1989) reprintedin Panama:

A Just Cause, U.S. Dept. of State Current Policy Doc. no. 1240, 1-2.
u Panama: International Legal Justifications, STATE DEPT. Doc. No. TFMP 02408337-4670 (1989).
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to avoid any direct threat to the canal or a direct challenge to
85
the proper exercise of U.S. rights.

In his December 20th statement to the U.N. Security Council,
Pickering acknowledged that the U.S. ability to ensure ummpeded
transit of vessels was not obstructed:
Even during the Nonega regime's illegal seizure of power,
the United States has continued to do what it has done since the
entry into force of the treaty a decade ago-providing for the
safe and orderly transit of vessels through the canal while assuring
increasing Panamaman participation in its management and operation.86
Even if the factual circumstances warranted U.S. action in selfdefense, the exercise of any such right must be consonant with the
provisions of the U.N. Charter Such an interpretation is supported
by article 21 of the O.A.S. Charter. The language of article 21
states that the right of self-defense must be exercised "in accordance with existing treaties," implying all treaties to which the
U.S. and Panama are parties, including the U.N. Charter.
Article 137 of the revised O.A.S. Charter specifically stipulates
that, "None of the provisions of this Charter shall be construed
as impairing the rights and obligations of the Member States under
the Charter of the United Nations." 87 Any right of the U.S. to
protect its nationals in Panama must be exercised in harmony with
articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter. Under the predominant
interpretations of these two U.N. provisions, the facts relied upon
by the U.S. in defending its action ultimately fail to withstand
legal scrutiny.
Although the U.S. generally asserted that its action was justified under article 21 of the O.A.S. Charter, other crucial provisions
of that instrument were not mentioned. Article 21 cannot be read
in isolation and must be interpreted in conjunction with articles 18
and 20 of the revised O.A.S. Charter.
Article 18 of the O.A.S. Charter contains a blanket prohibition
on intervention, including the use of armed force:
11Panama Canal: The Strategic Dimension, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Panama
Canal and Outer Continental Shelf of the House Committee on Merchant Marine &
Fishenes, 101st Cong., ist Sess. (1989) (statement of Michael G. Zozak, Deputy Assistant

Secretary for Inter-American Affairs).
Pickering, supra note 83, at 2.
O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 81, art. 137.
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No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other States. The foregoing principle prohibits not
only armed force but also any other form of interference or
attempted threat against the personality of the State or against
its political, economic and cultural elements. 8

Article 20 of the O.A.S. Charter expressly recognizes the territorial inviolability of a State and reaffirms the general prohibition
against military intervention: "The territory of a State is inviolable;
it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation
or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or
indirectly, on any grounds whatever." 9
The U.S. has imposed a strained construction on the O.A.S.
Charter by advocating that the action was not an intervention but
rather "an [a]ct of self-defense made inevitable by the cohabitation
.
which requires the presence of Americans-including American
troops in Panama.
"9o Although the U.S. has been accorded
the right under article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty to maintain
troops in certain designated areas of Panama until the year 2000,91
the explicit grant to the U.S. to maintain troops in Panama to
protect and defend the Canal cannot be construed to be a waiver
by Panama of the inviolability of the entire territory of Panama. 92
Nor can the rights granted to the U.S. under article IV be interpreted as a waiver of Panama's sovereign political rights, including
freedom from intervention against the personality of the state of
Panama or against its political elements as guaranteed under the
O.A.S. Charter. 9i No such waiver has been enunciated in the
Panama Canal Treaty nor can any such waiver reasonably be
implied. 94 The U.S. attack outside the Canal Zone against the
existing governmental structure in Panama was thus violative of
both articles.18 and 20 of the O.A.S. Charter.

u Id. at art. 18.
S9 Id. at art. 20.

90Dec. 22, 1989 O.A.S. Session, 95 (Doc. No. CP/ACTA 800/89) [hereinafter O.A.S.
Session].
9, See Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, 33 U.S.T. -,
T.I.A.S. No. 10030.
92 See id. Article 1(2) specifically grants to the U.S. the "rights necessary to manage,
operate, maintain, improve, protect and defend the Canal."
91Maier, United States Defense Rights in the Panama Canal Treaties: The Need for
Clarification of a Studied Ambiguity, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 287, 308-09 (1984).
9Id.
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The U.S. employed strong language in attempting to persuade
other O.A.S. members of the merit of its actions. U.S. Ambassador
Einuadi stated inter alia,
[W]e acted in Panama for legitimate reasons of self-defense
[we acted] in conformity with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
Article 21 of the Charter of the [O.A.S.], and the provisions of
the Panama Canal Treaties.
Above all, I would ask you to remember that the judgment
of Istory will lay upon this organization. By improperly invoking
the legitimate principle of nonintervention in this case, the O.A.S.
will find itself cast on the side of the dictators and the tyrants of
this world who are en route to extinction. It will find itself, in
objective terms, defending the indefensible. It will find itself on
the side of Nonega.
I am using strong language. In so doing, I am confident that
I reflect the long simmering outrage of the people of my own
country and I believe, of many in this hemisphere who are sick
of stolen elections, sick of military dictatorships, sick of narcostrongmen and sick of the likes of Manuel Noriega. This hennsphere, this organization, cannot afford to fail on these issues.
As I mentioned a moment ago, the United States acted
in self-defense and in defense of the Panama Canal Treaties. I
need not dwell on the immediate events and provocations that
precipitated our action-the gratuitous killing of an unarmed
American soldier, the terrorizing of a U.S. military couple, and
the general climate of intimidation and instability engineered by
Nonega, which by last weekend had become a clear and present
danger to our ability to meet our commitments under the Panama
Canal Treaty
In a word, when Nonega forced the issue, the United States
was forced to a path not of our choosing, but a path dictated by
our national rights and responsibilities. In all frankness, is this
orgamzation now prepared to forfeit the respect which it has
earned in the eyes of the American people and the moral authority
which it enjoys throughout this hemisphere by challenging the
just verdict that history has decreed upon Manuel Nonega? 95
The O.A.S. was unpersuaded by these remarks. Noting the
U.S. obligation to abstain from intervemng, directly or indirectly,
for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State, and affirming the right of Panamanians to self-determination

93Einaudi, supra note 80, at 3.
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without outside interference, the O.A.S. overwhelmingly approved
a resolution that deeply deplored the U.S. military intervention in
Panama. The resolution also called for an immediate end to the
96
fighting.
The sentiments articulated by the Jamaican delegate to the
O.A.S. were representative of those of most O.A.S. delegations.
The Jamaican representative stated,
The Government of the United States communicated with the
Government of Jamaica in the early hours of Wednesday morning
to advise that the invasion was under way and to explain the
reasons for the action taken.
We have carefully considered these reasons and have consulted with as many regional governments as we have been able
to reach.
These discussions have confirmed and supported
our view that none of the reasons so far advanced by the United
States in support of their action can possibly justify this grave
breach of the most fundamental principle of international law
We regard it moreover as a retrograde step in the relations
between the United States and countries in this hemisphere. It is
in conflict with the right of individual nations to self-determination and dramatically at variance with the worldwide trend towards the renunciation of force as a means of settling international
disputes. 97
Displeasure with, and resentment of, the U.S. by Latin American countries did not terminate with the approval of the O.A.S.
Resolution. These countries continue to harbor ill feelings about
the invasion. 9
C.

Maintainingthe Integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties

In addition to the U.N. and O.A.S. Charter defenses, the U.S.
tried to justify its actions under the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty
However, the U.S. action cannot be justified under the Panama
Canal Treaty because no direct threat to the Canal or Canal

9Twenty delegations voted in favor of the resolution, six abstained (El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela, Antigua, and Costa Rica) and the U.S. cast the only
dissenting vote. See supra note 72, at 110-i1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1989, § A, at 15, col.
6; Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 1989, § A, at 7, col. 5.
O.A.S. Session, supra note 90, at 131-32.
U.S. Vice President Quayle travelled to Latin America in early 1990. The leaders
of Mexico, Venezuela, and Peru refused to meet with him so soon after the U.S. invasion.
The leaders of Honduras and Jamaica impressed upon him the need to remove the excess
U.S. troops from Panama. L.A. Daily Journal, Feb. 12, 1990, at 6, col. 1.
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operations existed. Even if the U.S. allegations that threats to the
Canal arising from within Panama existed were accurate, unilateral
action to protect the Canal against such threats has no basis of
support in the text of the 1977 Treaties or their negotiating history.
Even if the U.S. did possess an independent right of intervention
to protect the Canal against Panamanian threats, such a right
would necessarily be limited to ensuring peaceful transit through
the Canal. The circumstances of the invasion failed to comply with
this requirement.
The U.S. has maintained that article IV of the Panama Canal
Treaty gives it both the right and duty to protect and defend the
Panama Canal. The U.S. contends that it was entitled under the
treaty to take measures to defend U.S. military personnel and U.S.
installations and respond to the threat to canal operations:
[Tihe United States has both the right, and for that matter,
the duty to protect and defend the Panama Canal under Article
4 of the Panama Canal Treaty The basic U.S. responsibility is
to operate and defend the Panama Canal until its transfer to
Panama at the end of this century
For the past 2 years the Nonega regime engaged in a systematic campaign to harass and mtinudate U.S. and Panamanian
employees of the Panama Canal commission and the U.S.
forces.
IThis provocative and intolerable behavior reached a
peak last Friday It threatened American and Panamanian lives
as well as Canal operations.
We resorted to military action
where our ability to honor
obligations under the Panama Canal Treaty was threatened by
violent actions. 99
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
ordinary meaning given to the terms of the Treaty text is the single
most important element in interpreting treaties.'10

" Pickering, supra note 83, at 2.
10 Articles of the Vienna Convention provide as follows:

Article 31. General rule of interpretation.

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:

(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all
the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instru-

1990-91]

INVASION OF PANAMA

The Panama Canal Treaty recognizes the territorial sovereignty
of Panama over the Canal. As territorial sovereign, Panama expressly grants the U.S. the rights necessary to, among other things,
protect and defend the Canal. Article 1(2) of the Treaty provides

as follows:
In accordance with the terms of this Treaty and related
agreements, the Republic of Panama, as territorial sovereign,
grants to the United States of America, for the duration of this
Treaty, the nghts necessary to regulate the transit of ships through
the Panama Canal, and to manage, operate, maintain, improve,
protect and defend the Canal. 10
Under article IV(1) of the Treaty, the U.S. retans primary
responsibility for protecting and defending the Canal until the year
2000:
For the duration of this Treaty, the United States of America
shall have primary responsibility to protect and defend the Canal.
The nghts of the United States of America to station, train and
move military forces within the Republic of Panama are described
in the Agreement in Implementation of this Article, signed this
date.1o2
Since the U.S. assumes only primary responsibility for protecting and defending the Canal, it does not have exclusive responsi-

ment which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended.
Article 32. Supplementary means of interpretation.
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or
to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Arts. 31-32 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
201 Panama Canal Treaty, supra Note 91, at art. 1(2).
I- Id. at art. IV(1).
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bility, but has joint responsibility with Panama to protect and
defend the Canal. Article 1(3) states, "The Republic of Panama
shall participate increasingly in the management and protection
and defense of the Canal, as provided m this Treaty "o103
Article IV(1) further provides,
The United States of America and the Republic of Panama
commit themselves to protect and defend the Panama Canal.
Each Party shall act, in accordance with its constitutional processes, to meet the danger resulting from an armed attack or other
actions which threaten the security of the Panama Canal or of
ships transiting it. °4
Under article IV(l) of the Treaty, the U.S. needs to establish
foremost that an armed attack or other actions threatened the
Canal. The U.S. alleged violations of U.S. military bases and
instances of detention and harassment of U.S. and Panamaman
employees of the Canal Commission. The relationship between
these actions and threats to the Canal is difficult to see unless the
U.S. is alleging that the general atmosphere in Panama gave it
justifiable concern that the security of the Canal was threatened.
Yet, any such concern must be viewed with a measure of skepticism
because U.S. Representative Kozak acknowledged just one month
prior to the invasion that Noriega sought to avoid any direct threat
to the Canal. 05
Even assuming internal Panamaman threats to the Canal existed, it is highly questionable whether the U.S. had an individual
duty of action or even an individual right of action to protect the
Canal. The Treaty envisages a regime of collective, not individual,
action to ensure the safe, efficient, and uninterrupted operation of
the Canal. Article 1(4) obligates both parties to cooperate to ensure
open access to the Canal: "In view of the special relationship
established by this Treaty, the United States of America and the
Republic of Panama shall co-operate to assure the uninterrupted
and efficient operation of the Panama Canal." 1 6
More noteworthy, article IV(3) and (4) set forth the cooperative
measures to be undertaken by the armed forces of both countries,
including the preparation of contingency plans for the protection
and defense of the Canal:
Id. at art. 1(3).
Id. at art. IV(b).
10,Panama Canal: The Strategic Dimension, supra note 85, at 3.
106 Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 91, at art. 1(4).
103
104
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(3) In order to facilitate the participation and cooperation of
the armed forces of both Parties in the protection and defense
of the Canal, the United States of America and the Republic of
Panama shall establish a Combined Board comprised of an equal
number of semor military representatives of each Party These
representatives shall be charged by their respective governments
with consulting and cooperating on all matters pertaining to the
protection and defense of the Canal, and with planning for
actions to be taken in concert for that purpose.
The Combined Board shall provide for coordination and cooperation concermng such matters as:
(a) The preparation of contingency plans for the protection
and defense of the Canal based upon the cooperative efforts of
the armed forces of both Parties;
(b) The planning and conduct of combined military exercises;
and
(c) The conduct of United States and Panamanian military
operations with respect to the protection and defense of the
Canal.
(4) The Combined Board shall, at five-year intervals, throughout the duration of this Treaty, review the resources being made
available by the two Parties for the protection and defense of the
Canal. Also, the Combined Board shall make appropriate recommendations to the two Governments respecting projected requirements, the efficient utilization of available resources of the two
Parties, and other matters of mutual interest with respect to the
protection and defense of the Canal.10 7
The Panama Canal Treaty fails to address explicitly the situation where the Canal is threatened by internal events within Panama or to define the rights and obligations of the U.S. in such a
situation. One commentator suggests that failing to include a provision in the treaties dealing with such a contingency is understandable:
[I]t would be politically unacceptable for Panama explicitly
to grant the United States a right to use force against it in the
event of a breach of the treaties. Panama, as a sovereign state,
could never accept such a provision; and there might be serious
political repercussions among our [U.S.] allies if the United States
108
tried to insist on the inclusion of such a provision.

101Id. at art. IV(3), (4).

"I Note, Legal Issues Involved in the Transfer of the Canal to Panama, 19 HARvARD
INT'L L.J. 279, 295 (1978).
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A cogent argument can be developed that the U.S. may act to
protect and defend the Canal only if the Republic of Panama
agrees to such action. The cooperative regime established under
the treaty, whereby protection and defense of the Canal is to be
facilitated by a joint U.S.-Panamanian defense force, strengthens
the thesis that unilateral U.S. action to defend the canal has no
foundation under the Treaty 109 Arguably the U.S. is not entitled
to act against any threat to the Canal without Panama's consent,
especially where the Canal is threatened by actions from within
Panama.
Cast in a light most favorable to the U.S., the circumstances,
if any, under which the U.S. may act unilaterally to defend the
Panama Canal cannot be definitively ascertained by reference to
the text of the Treaty Under the rules set forth in the Vienna
Convention, this issue can be resolved by reference to 1) treaties
in par materia, 2) any agreements regarding the interpretation of
the treaty, 3) relevant rules of international law applicable to both
the U.S. and Panama, and 4) the negotiating history and context
in which the Treaty was signed. 110
The Neutrality Treaty is in part materia with the Panama Canal
Treaty since both were negotiated concurrently and with respect to
the same subject matter " The Neutrality Treaty establishes the
permanent neutrality of the Canal. 12 Article IV of the Neutrality
Treaty requires Panama and the U.S. to maintain the neutrality of
the Canal: "The United States of America and the Republic of

109 In testimony before the U S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Secretary of

a partnership under which our two countries
State Vance stated that the Treaties "create
can join in the peaceful and efficient operation of the Canal." New Panama Canal Treaties,
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)

(statement of Cyrus Vance, Sec. of State).
11o
See Vienna Convention, supra note 100.
M'See Maier, supra note 93, at 300.

112
Article I states, "The Republic of Panama declares that the Canal, as an international transit waterway, shall be permanently neutral in accordance with the regime estab" Article II further states,
lished in this Treaty.
The Republic of Panama declares the neutrality of the Canal in order
that both in time of peace and in time of war shall remain secure and open
to peaceful transit by the vessels of all nations on terms of entire equality, so

that there will be no discrimination against any nation, or its citizens or
subjects, concerning the conditions or charges of transit, or for any other
reason, and so that the Canal, and therefore the Isthmus of Panama shall not
be the target of reprisals in any armed conflict between nations of the world.

Panama Canal Permanent Neutrality and Operation Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United StatesPanama, 33 U.S.T.

-,

T.I.A.S. No. 10029.

1990-91]

INVASION OF PANAMA

Panama agree to maintain the regime of Neutrality established in
this Treaty, which shall be maintained in order that the Canal shall
remain permanently neutral, notwithstanding the termination of
any other treaties entered into by the two Contracting Parties.""' 3
During the course of the U.S. Senate debate on ratification of
the 1977 Treaties, the U.S. asserted it had a unilateral right to
resort to force if necessary to maintain the regime of neutrality 114
Panamanian negotiators vehemently disputed this position and
maintained that the Neutrality Treaty provided no right of intervention absent Panamaman consent.1 5 The two countries found
themselves at an impasse. The position assumed by each party
represented equally unwelcome possibilities to the other. As Maier
explains,
The United States and the Republic of Panama were faced
with a serious political and legal dilemma growing out of issues
related to intervention. The treaties were viewed as vitally important by the governments of both countries; but a right to intervene
to protect the Canal was important to United States Senate approval-and an anathema to the Panamanian public." 6
To overcome the impasse, President Carter and President Torrijos issued an unsigned statement of interpretation that was subsequently incorporated into the Neutrality Treaty as an amendment:
Under the treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and
operation of the Panama Canal [the neutrality treaty], Panama
and the United States have the responsibility to assure that the
Panama Canal will remain open and secure to ships of all nations.
The correct interpretation of this principle is that each of the two
countries shall, in accordance with their Constitutional processes,
defend the Canal against the threat to the regime of neutrality,
and consequently shall have the right to act against any aggression
or threat directed against the Canal or against the peaceful transit
of vessels through the Canal.
This does not mean, nor shall it be interpreted as the right

Id. at art. IV
Note, supra note 87, at 293.
M,In an August 1977 news conference, Panama's chief negotiator Romula Bethancourt
rejected any unilateral rights of U.S. intervention under the Neutrality Treaty: "The Neutrality pact does not provide that the United States will say when neutrality is violated
the two countries jointly will determine how they will guard against such a violation
The pact does not establish that the U.S. has the right to intervene in Panama." Maier,
supra note 93, at 300 n.66.
116Maier, The Right to Defend the Panama Canal, 13 GA. J. INT'L L. 217, 219 (1983).
",

'4 See
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of intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of
Panama. Any United States action will be directed at insuring
that the Canal will remain open, secure and accessible, and it
shall never be directed against the territorial integrity or political
17
independence of Panama.
The words "each of the two countries" in the first paragraph
seems to signify that the U.S. has a separate right to defend the
Canal. The right to act against "any aggression or threat" seems
to confer a broad right of unilateral action against any perceived
threat, presumably including a threat from within Panama. However, by employing terms from article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,
the second paragraph severely qualifies and limits the interventionary rights of the U.S. 1 8 As discussed earlier, articles 2(4) and 51
of the U.N. Charter are viewed by most states as contaiing a
general prohibition against the use of force by individual states,
except in self-defense where a prior armed attack against the geographical territory of the state has occurred. Since the Panama
Canal Treaty explicitly recognizes the sovereignty of Panama over
the former Canal Zone and the Canal, there is no conceivable basis
upon which the U.S. can unilaterally resort to force in the Canal
Zone without compromising the territorial integrity of Panama."19
Panama certainly did not surrender its rights of territorial sovereignty within the Canal Zone. The U.S. State Department itself
has acknowledged that the U.S. never exercised sovereignty over
the Canal Zone even before 1977 The U.S. merely exercised treaty
rights within Panamaman territoryIn allowing Panama to assume jurisdiction over the zone, the
United States is not giving up sovereignity over territory which
belongs to us, like Alaska and the Louisiana territory Legally

the zone has always remamed Panamanian territory and the United
States has never had sovereignty over it, merely treaty rights
within it.120
On the other hand, an argument can be made that U.S. action
within Panamanian territory in order to ensure that the Canal

M.The Statement of Understanding issued by the two leaders was intended merely to
serve as an interpretation of the text rather than an alteration of it. Maier, supra note 93,
at 302.
I'8 See id. at 302-08.
"9 Id. at 303-05.
120 New Treaties, supra note 10, at 8.
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remains open and accessible (even without Panamanian consent) is
not violative of the non-intervention language since such action
does not seek a change in Panama's territory Additionally, such
action would not amount to intermeddling in the political affairs
of Panama.12 During Senate deliberations on the 1977 Treaties,
the State Department and the Justice Department advanced such
an argument. 122 Although this argument may carry weight as to
threats from third parties, it is difficult to discern how responding
unilaterally to an internal threat to the Canal would not encroach
upon the political independence of Panama by usurping Panama's
sovereign political right to respond to internal events within its
own territory '2 At a immum, unilateral U.S. intervention to
protect the Canal against threats arising from within Panama has
no foundation in the Neutrality Treaty as interpreted by the CarterTorrijos Statement of Understanding.
During the ratification process, Democratic Senator DeConcim
introduced a reservation to the Neutrality Treaty proclaiming a
unilateral right of military intervention in the event Canal operations were impeded.iu The U.S. Senate initially approved the Neutrality Treaty with this unilateral reservation. Panama was incensed
by the adoption of the reservation, declaring that it amounted to
a violation of the U.N. Charter since the U.S. was effectively
,21Maier, supra note 93, at 303.
'2 Assistant U.S. Attorney General John Harmon stated the following in a 1977 letter
to Senator John Sparkman:
A legitimate exercise of rights under the Neutrality Treaty by the United
States would not either in intent or in fact, be directed against the territorial
integrity or political independence of Panama. No question of detaching
territory from the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Panama would arise, nor
would the political independence of Panama be violated by measures calculated
to uphold a commitment to the maintenance of the Canal's neutrality which
Panama has freely assumed. A use of force in these circumstances would not
be directed against the form or character or composition of the Government
of Panama or any other aspect of political independence; it would be solely
directed and proportionately crafted to maintain the neutrality of the Canal.
Letter from Assistant Attorney General John Harman to Senator John Sparkman (Nov. 1,
1977) reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 329, 332 (1977).
"I Maier, supra note 93, at 308-11.
124The Reservation stated the following:
[I]f the canal is closed, or its operations are interfered with, the United
States of America and the Republic of Panama shall each independently have
the right to take such steps as it deems necessary, in accordance with its
constitutional processes, including the use of military force in Panama, to
reopen or restore the operations of the canal, as the case may be.
PanamaCanal Treaties: Major Carter Victory, 34 CONG. Q. ALmANAC 379, 393 (1978).
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insisting that the U.S. had a license to indefinitely undertake military action on Panamaman territory without Panama's consent.'2
To allay Panamanian objections and to obviate the need for an
additional Panamanian plebiscite, a compromise reservation was
adopted to the'Panama Canal Treaty,126 which reaffirmed U.S.
adherence to the principle of non-intervention and strictly limited
U.S. action to ensuring that the Canal remain open, secure, and
accessible:
Pursuant to its adherence to the principle of non-intervention,
any action taken by the United States of America in the exercise
of its rights to assure that the Panama Canal shall remain open,
neutral, secure and accessible, shall be only for the purpose of
assuring that the Canal shall remain open, neutral, secure and
accessible, and shall not have as its purpose or be interpreted as
a right of intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of
Panama or interference with its political independence or sovereign territory 127
Panamanian objections to the imtial DeConcim reservation,
coupled with the compromise reservation adopted, provide persuasive evidence that both parties intended, at the very least, to exclude
any unilateral right of U.S. action to defend the Canal against
internal Panamaman threats. Responding to threats from within
Panama, without Panamanian consent, would effectively amount
to interference in the internal affairs of Panama and would compromise Panama's political independence.

Such action also would be inconsistent with article 18 of the
O.A.S. Charter, an international treaty to which both Panama and
the U.S. are parties.128 This provision strictly forbids any form of
interference against the personality of the State or against its
29
political elements.
To embrace an interpretation allowing unilateral U.S. action in
such circumstances also would be in violation of article 103 of the
U.N. Charter, which establishes the primacy of U.N. Charter ob-

12,

G. Mo-

r, supra note 10, at 88-90, 100-101.

'1 Id. at 88-90.
'27 Maier, supra note 116, at 223.

M O.A.S. CEARTER, supra note 82, at art. 18.
129Id.
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ligations over inconsistent obligations under other international
agreements.130
Even if there were internal threats to the Canal, an interpretation allowing the U.S. a unilateral right to act to protect the
Canal against such threats has no basis of support in the text of
the 1977 Treaties, the negotiating history of both Treaties, or in
the relevant rules of international law applicable to both the U.S.
and Panama.
Assuming arguendo that the U.S. does possess an independent
right of intervention to protect the Canal against threats inside
Panama, such a right would not be an open ended one. 3 ' Rather,
the exercise of any such right would need to be strictly limited to
ensuring peaceful transit through the Canal. Adopting this interpretation does not in any way purge the taint of illegality from the
U.S. action; the U.S. action was not limited to assuring open and
secure access to the Canal. A full scale invasion of virtually the
entire territory of Panama was launched by the U.S., using massive
military force directed against the Panamanian government. Panama certainly did not expressly or implicitly relinquish its political
independence or the territorial inviolability of the entire state of
Panama.' 32 The U.S. action is at least in contravention of previous
U.S. interpretations of the 1977 Treaties concermng the permissible
parameters of unilateral U.S. action.
Rather than maintaimng the integrity of the 1977 Treaties, the
U.S. invasion undermined the principal aim of these Treaties of
assuring umnterrupted transit through the Canal. As a result of

-3 Article 103 of the U.N. Charter states, "In the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail." U.N. CHARTm, ch. XVI, art. 103, para. 1. Ironically, article 103 of
the U.N. Charter and the unanimous U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations were relied
upon by the U.S. State Department in denouncing the illegality of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. The Soviets unsuccessfully attempted to defend their actions in the U.N. on
the basis of a Treaty of Fnendslp and Mutual Assistance previously entered into with
Afghanistan. Pursuant to the Brezhnev Doctrine, the U.S.S.R. asserted the Treaty gave it
the right and the duty to intervene militarily in its neighboring socialist state. E. HOYT,
supra note 7, at 237 n.l.
- Even if it is acknowledged that U.S. military action aimed exclusively at defending
the Panama Canal against internal aggression is not violative of the territorial integrity or
political independence of Panama, a massive armed invasion that overthrows a governmental
regime would definitely violate the political independence of Panama since it is directed
against the character and composition of the Government of Panama. See Schachter, supra
note 48, at 1637-38.
"I Maier, supra note 93, at 308-09.
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the invasion, the Canal was closed for the first time in its 75 year
history 133
D.

Restoring Democracy in Panama

As moral and political justification for the invasion, the U.S.
claimed that the action facilitated the restoration of democracy in
Panama. Ambassador Einuadi emphasized that the invasion should
be warmly embraced by the O.A.S. for achieving this objective:
Today, we are once again living in historic times, a time when
a great principle is spreading across the world like wild fire. That
principle, as we all know, is the revolutionary idea that people,
not governments, are sovereign. This principle is the essence of
the democratic form of government. It is by no means a new
idea. But it is an idea which has, in this decade, and especially
in this historic year-1989-acquired the force of historical necessity
It was not too long ago that many governments and regimes
usurped the sovereign right of their peoples m the name of allencompassing ideologies. Those pretensions, those mystifications,
have now been unmasked for the fraud that they are. Democracy
today is synonymous with legitimacy the world over; it is, m
short, the umversal value of our time. Regimes which are undemocratic may employ violence or terror to subvert the sovereign
will of their citizenry for a time; they may invoke, and in so
doing pervert, the principle of national sovereignty to forestall
the truly sovereign judgment of their own people. But m the eyes
of their people, they are illegitimate, and they will fail.
It was not too long ago that it was fashionable in certain
quarters to argue that democracy was the privilege of a relatively
few nations, and not the birth-right of all humanity Try telling
that today to the peoples of Eastern Europe. Try telling that to
the people of this hemisphere who, in the early part of this
decade, unleashed the great democratic tide which is now sweeping the globe. That tide has now returned to this hemisphere m
the last month of tis decade, with a free election in Chile and
the restoration of democracy in Panama.
In the name of all those throughout the Americas who have

"

Michael J. Rhode, Jr., Secretary of the Panama Canal Commission, stated that the

Canal was closed as a precautionary measure due to a concern that the proximity of ships
in the Canal to land could render them vulnerable to Panamaman aggressions. Washington
Post, Dec. 21, 1989, § A, at 31, col. 4.
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struggled, fought and died for freedom
m the name of the
Panamanian citizens who have suffered Nonega's outrages,
[the O.A.S.] should do what is nght-it should welcome the
restoration of democracy in Panama. It is time that this orgamzation welcomed Nonega's departure, just as the world has in
the past welcomed the departure of Somoza, Duvalier, Marcos,
and, more recently, Honecker, Zhivkov, and Husak. It is time
that this organization put itself on the right side of history 13

The O.A.S. Charter identifies the establishment of democracy
as a condition for fulfilling the organization's aims. Article 3 of
the Charter states, "The solidarity of the American states and the
high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of
1 35
representative democracy.1
The existence of representative democracy among O.A.S. member states is a vision and not a binding legal obligation. Article 13
of the O.A.S. Charter proclaims the right of each state to develop
its own political life freely 136 Failure to establish democracy does
not give rise to a right of unilateral military intervention to facili-

"3 Einuadi, supra note 80, at 3. Einuadi's reliance upon the democratic tide sweeping
Eastern Europe totally misses the point and weakens the U.S. position. Once the Soviet
Union withdrew military support, Eastern European governments, lacking popular support,
quickly faltered. The lesson to be learned from Eastern Europe may be that governments
lacking popular consent cannot continue to exist indefinitely. Ifthe U.S. had learned this
lesson, it would have realized that the Nonega government, lacking popular legitimacy,
would have eventually witnessed its own undoing. Forcing democracy on a country cannot
be justified as a lesson learned from Eastern Europe.

"I O.A.S. CHARR, supra note 81, at art. 3. The Preamble to the O.A.S. Charter
also recognizes the existence of democratic institutions as a political ideal: "Confident that
the true significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the
consolidation on this continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a
system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of
man." Id. at Preamble; D. A~aSRmoNO, supra note 6, at 100.
116See A. THOMAS, Tm OROANIZAMoN oF AmimucAN STATES at 212-245 (1963). Thomas
sketches the record of the O.A.S. in promoting democracy in the Americas and concludes
as follows:
[There has been an apparent unwillingness to adopt binding legal obligations that each nation in this hemisphere shall become a democracy
Pan-Amencamsm has
stress[ed]
the principle that a state must
be free to choose any form of government or political institution it desires,
must be free to treat its own citizens as it wishes.
Since the first stirrings
of the movement, democracy has been stressed as an inter-Amencan goal.
[N]evertheless, no firm legal obligations
have been agreed upon to
assure the growth of democracy throughout the region.
Id. at 227-39.
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tate the creation or restoration of democratic institutions. To the
contrary, article 18 of the revised O.A.S. Charter forbids armed
intervention for any reason in the internal affairs of any other
State. The promotion of democracy in Panama through the sword
of unilateral U.S. military action is prohibited under the O.A.S.
Charter.
No authority in the United Nations Charter allows the unilateral use of force to install democratic government. One legal scholar
has called for a reinterpretation of article 2(4) to legitimize the
unilateral use of force against a repressive regime, provided such
37
action enhances the right of the people to self-determination.

'13 Acknowledging that intervention to establish democracy is not legally justified, one
commentator insists nonetheless that human rights law demands intervention against tyranny
when those in "monopolistic control of the weapons and instruments of suppression m a
" D'Amato, The
country turn those weapons and instruments against their own people.
Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 Am. J. INT'L L. 516, 519
(1990). D'Amato has gone so far as to suggest that there is no violation of the territorial
integrity of a State absent an intent to annex part of the territory of the State. Nor is the
political independence of a State compromised unless there was an intent to colonize, annex,
or incorporate the State into the invading State. Accordingly, D'Amato asserts that the
U.S. intervention in Panama was not violative of article 2(4) because Panama was before
and after the intervention an "independent nation."
D'Amato's analysis is fatally deficient in several respects. Under D'Amato's definition
of political independence, if a state uses massive force to topple a regime, the political
independence of a State is not compromised provided there was no intent to colonize or
annex the State into the invading state. From this definition, Nanda has accurately deduced
that the Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghamstan, and the Nazi
invasions of several European nations were not directed against the political independence
of those states. Nanda, supra note 1, at 494, 499 n.29. D'Amato has ascribed the same
meaning to territorial integrity and political independence. Certainly, the drafters of article
2(4) would not have included different terms if they had the same meamng. To do so would
have been unnecessarily redundant. D'Amato's understanding of those terms is simply
misplaced. As Farer has aptly stated, if sovereignty means anytung, it means inter alia that
one state cannot "dictate the character or the occupants of its governing institutions."
D'Amato, supra, at 520.
D'Amato's assertion that any nation with the will and the resources may intervene to
protect the population of another nation against tyranny is especially problematic. Is he not
in effect advocating that the U.S. act as a global policeman, protecting citizens against the
tyranny of their own leaders? Under D'Amato's formula, the U.S. many presumably
determine when the leaders of a country are acting in a tyrannical fashion. This self-judging
approach is highly dangerous. D'Amato does not inform us as to what point in the
continuum of tyranny the right of unilateral intervention is activated.
Human rights abuses exist in numerous countries throughout the world. Is Professor
D'Amato endorsing a unilateral right of U.S. action anywhere m the world where instruments of suppression are being used against citizens and, if so, is he not then essentially
sanctioning unilateral U.S. military intervention in close to half the countries in the world?
Surely, Professor D'Amato must realize these dangers.
See Nanda, supra note 1, at 494, 499 n.29; Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter
Paradigm, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 503, 507 (1990).
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Yet, not a scintilla of evidence can be found in the U.N. Charter
that supports an interpretation rendenng the general prohibition
against unilateral use of force subservient to the nght of self8
determination. 1
Reisman states that the U.N. established a comprehensive collective security system that never realized its ann of halting unilateral resort to force. In elucidating this claim, Reisman draws an
analogy between the U.N. and an ineffective Sheriff in the Wild
West:
Intractable conflicts between contending public order systems
with planetary aspirations paralyzed the Security Council. The
U.N. Charter's mechanisms often proved ineffective. The situation was remimscent of the standard Amencan morality play- a
town in the 'Wild West' in the 19th century without a sheriff,
good people, perforce, carrying their own weapons and protecting
their rights as they see fit. A sheriff comes to town, announcing
that he brings with hun law and order. As he will henceforth
enforce the law, individuals no longer need carry weapons and
the town need not tolerate individual resort to force to protect
[W]ithin six months it becomes clear that
personal rights
the sheriff is utterly incapable of maintainmng order.
This
is what happened in the international system
was established according to which unilateral
[A] pattern
violations of Article 2(4) might be condemned but to all intents
and purposes validated, with the violator enjoying the benefits of
its delict. A curious legal gray area extended between the black
letter of the Charter and the bloody reality of world politics.
While the general Charter prohibition against unilateral action
continued, and appropriate organs of the United Nations frequently condemned such action, nothing was done beyond verbal

- Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: ConstruingArticle 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L
L. 642, 644 (1984). Reisman states that the right of self-determination is one of the pnmary
principles underlying the U.N. Charter. While this is true, there is not the slightest indication
in the U.N. Charter that the prohibition on unilateral recourse to force should be subservient
to the right of self-determination. As Schachter points out,
We are left to wonder why [the right of self-determination] is now
accorded primacy and treated as a "higher law" to which other aims and
principles must be subordinated. One would have expected that a proposition
so far-reaching in character would have been presented with an appropriate
legal and empirical foundation. As it is, it is almost startling to be told that
Article 2(4) is now only a means and that such aims as the maintenance of
peace and the prevention of aggression are secondary to the enhancement of
popular rule.
Schachter, supra note 74, at 647-48.
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condemnation. In many cases, the party subject to the condemnation, and hence in violation of international law, was permitted
to continue to benefit from the fruits of its illegal action. 13 9
As an alternative to routine condemnation of unilateral use of
force resulting from the mechanical application of article 2(4),
Reisman suggests that distinctions be formulated to establish the
legitimacy of certain actions that seek to foster the right of peoples
to determine their own political destimes:
The basic policy of contemporary international law has been
to maintain the political independence of territorial communities
so that they can continue to express their desire for political
community in a form appropriate to them.
Each application of Article 2(4) must enhance opportunities
for ongoing self-determination. Though all interventions are lamentable, the fact is that some may serve, in terms of aggregate
consequences, to increase the probability of the free choice of
peoples about their government and political structure.
The expression of Article 2(4), in the form of a rule, is
premised on a political context and a technological enviionment
that have been. changing inexorably since the end of the 19th
century The rule assumes that the only threat of usurpation of
the right of political independence of a people within a particular
territorial community is from external, overt invasion.
Coercion should not be glorified, but it is naive and indeed
subversive of public order to insist that it never be used, for
coercion is a ubiquitous feature of all social life and a characteristic and indispensable component of law The critical question
is
whether it was applied in support of or against
community order and basic policies.
In the construction of Article 2(4), attention must always be
given to the spirit of the Charter and not simply to the letter of
a particular provision.140
Though the removal of despotic regimes may promote values
considered desirable, 141 the risks associated with recognizing such
a right outweigh any benefits gained. A "reinterpretation" of
article 2(4) to legitimize the removal of despotic regimes would
unleash violence on both the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter

"I

Reisman, supra note 138, at 643.

,40 Id. at 643-45.
1'

See Schachter, supra note 63, at 143.
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and tend to destroy, rather than enhance, order in the international

community

142

As previously outlined,1 43 some states and commentators advocate a right of humanitarian intervention to rescue nationals
abroad. According to this view, such action does not violate the
territorial integrity and political independence of a state provided
it is aimed exclusively at, and carefully circumscribed to, rescuing
nationals. Certainly, even those asserting a broad right of humanitanan intervention would not credibly maintain that the use of
force to overthrow a repressive regime does not contravene the
political independence of the state and consequently article 2(4).144
As Schachter convincingly reasons,
[E]ven if a case can be made that independently of Article
51 a limited rescue mission does not fall within the prohibition
of Article 2(4), it is difficult to extend that argument to justify
an armed invasion to topple a repressive regime. IFlor a foreign
power to overthrow the government of an independent state is
surely "against the political independence of that state," whatever
its internal political structure. The idea that wars waged in a good
cause such as democracy and human rights would not involve a
violation of territorial integrity or political independence demands
an Orwellian construction to those terms. 14S
The 1970 Declaration on Principlesof InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly Relations and CooperationAmong States in Accordance with the Charterof the UnitedNationsis entirely consistent
with Schachter's thesis. The unanimous 1970 Declaration proclaims
that,
No State
has the right to intervene, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State
or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in

violation of international law

146

See Schachter, supra note 74, at 646-47.
See supra notes 44-76 and accompanying text.
'" But see D'Amato, supra note 137, at 519-20.
" Schachter, supra note 74, at 649.
I" G.A.Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
Although this resolution is nonbinding, it does provide persuasive evidence of the international community's interpretation of the provisions of the U.N. Charter.
12

",
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While insisting that its invasion be applauded, the U.S. admits
that it does not have a legal right to intervene to restore democracy:
I am not here this mormng to claim a right on behalf of the
United States to enforce the will of history by intervening in favor
of democracy where we are not welcomed. We are champions of
democracy, but not the gendarme of democracy-not in this
hemisphere or anywhere else. 47

Irrespective of U.S. statements disclaimning a legal right to
intervene forcibly to bring about democratic rule, the U.S., by
citing the restoration of democracy as a justification for the action,
has essentially endorsed the use of force in such circumstances.
This endorsement constitutes an effective resurrection of the Johnson Doctrine. Under the Johnson Doctnne, the U.S. proclaimed a
right of military intervention to save democracy After the Dominican Republic invasion, the Doctrine was discredited by most Latin
American countries as inconsistent with the principle of self-determination and devoid of any basis of legal support in the InterAmerican system.1 48 The original proclamation of a right to intervene to save democracy was at least more understandable when
considered in the context of the Cold War and the East-West
ideological confrontation. The Soviet Union has recently shed its
excess ideological baggage, recognizing that ideological dogmatism
has done more to promote confrontation than to achieve the fundamental objective of the U.N. m maintaining peace and security 149
Allowing Eastern European countries to pursue their own destimes
free from outside intermeddling amounts to a renunciation of the
Brezhnev Doctrine under which the Soviets sought to maintain a
147Einaudi, supra note 80, at 3.

I" See Lillich, supra note 53, at 341-51.
141Gorbachev has completely eliminated the notion of "class struggle" in international
relations and has emphatically rejected the inevitability of conflict between the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. According to the Soviets, the rejection of the traditional polarization has been
necessitated principally by the emergence of umversal human values and the survival of
mankind:
The supremacy of universal human values and observance of umversal
rules of the world community are the imperatives of our time. The objective
requirements of the age we live in, its trends, character and circumstances
leave mankind no other choice but to reject the traditional polarization. This
is the axiom which underlies both the concept and the practical policies of the
new thinking. Of course, it cannot resolve the existing contradictions overnight,
but as a start it can alleviate them.
Excerpts from September 26, 1989 Speech by Shevardnadze to U.N., reprinted in Foreign
Policy and Perestroika5-14 (1989).
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sphere of influence in Eastern Europe by proclaimnng a right and
duty to intervene to save embattled Socialist countries.5 0
The revival of the Johnson Doctrine by the Bush Adnunistration opens up a Pandora's box. It provides an additional avenue
of cover for unlawful armed intervention. The Panama invasion
itself offers prime proof of this assertion. It is hard to believe that
the U.S. action was designed to restore democracy in Panama
when Panama has not historically been subject to democratic rule.
For virtually twenty years prior to the U.S. invasion, Panama was
ruled by a series of military dictators, most of whom enjoyed U.S.
support, including Nonega, who was a paid C.I.A. informant
almost until the end of his tenure in power.' 5'
Legitmzing intervention to establish democratic rule also dramatically erodes the legal boundaries on recourse to force. As
Schachter accurately observes,
It
introduce[s] a new normative basis for recourse to war
that would give powerful states an almost unlimited right to
overthrow governments alleged to be unresponsive to the popular
will
That invasions may at times serve democratic values
must be weighed against the dangerous consequences
of legiti52
numzing armed attacks against peaceful governments.
E. Apprehending Noriegafor Trial in the United States on
Drug Trafficking Charges
In 1988, General Nonega was indicted by two U.S. federal
grand juries in Florida on charges of laundering money and accepting bribes from Colombia's Medellin drug cartel and other
drug traffickers.s 3 In his December 20, 1989 statement to the U.N.
Security Council, U.S. Ambassador Pickering justified the U.S.

See Butler, infra note 197; see infra note 200.
See Church, supra note 26.
112Schachter, supra note 74, at 649 (footnote omitted).
1$3Nonega was indicted by a federal grand jury i Miami on racketeenng charges.
The indictment alleges in part that Nonega participated in a conspiracy between 1981 and
1983, during which time he accepted more than $4.6 million in bribes in exchange for
offering Panama as a refimng and transshipment point for cocaine and as a haven for drug
250

lords from the notorious Colombian Medellin cartel, which reportedly handles the bulk of
cocaine smuggled into the U.S. Nonega also allegedly permitted illegal profits from U.S.
drug sales to be laundered through Panamaman banks. A federal grand jury in Tampa
handed down a separate indictment against Noriega, which charges him with accepting a
bribe from a drug trafficker who was smuggling in excess of 1.4 million pounds of marijuana
into the U.S. See Lacayo, supra note 25, at 25.
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capture of Noriega on the basis of a novel theory that is without
legal precedent in modern historyThere is another issue at stake in this debate over Panamathe disgrace, the terrible evil of drug trafficking. We have been
reminded again of the terrible price brave men and women-and
whole societies-pay because these monsters-these drug traffickers-continue in our midst.
This is a war as deadly and as dangerous as any fought with
armies massed across borders; the survival of democratic nations
is at stake.
Countries that provide safe haven and support for the international drug trafficking cartels menace the peace and security
just as surely as if they were using their own conventional military
forces to attack our societies. The truth is, and everyone of us
knows it, General Nonega turned Panama into a haven for drug
traffickers and a centre for money laundering and transshipment
of cocaine. General Nonega could not be permitted falsely to
wrap himself in the flag of Panamanian sovereignty while the
drug cartels with which he is allied intervene throughout this
hemisphere. That is aggression. It is aggression against us all,
15 4
and now it is being brought to an end.
It is unclear from these remarks whether the U.S. considers the
activities of drug cartels and the provision of sanctuary for them
by a foreign head of state as tantamount to aggression against the
U.S. The 1974 General Assembly Resolution defimng aggression
offers no support for this position. The Definition of Aggression
establishes that the U.S. invasion of Panama rather than the activities of Nonega amounts to an illegal act of aggression. The Definition of Aggression states that "[a]ggression is the use of armed
force by a State against
another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in

114U.S. Ambassador Einuadi suggested to the O.A.S. that Nonega's aggression against
the U.S. preceded the formal declaration of war by the Nonega controlled National

Assembly of Representatives five days before the invasion:
There has been a good deal of mention about the fact that General
Nonega declared war on the United States a few days ago. But the truth of
the matter is that he declared war on my country a long time ago, from the
moment he concluded his first deal with the narcovermin who are wreaking
havoc on our city streets and who seek to destroy our nations most precious
resource, its youth. Nonega and his ilk, whoever they are and wherever they
may be, are guilty of nothing less than premeditated aggression against my
country.
Einuadi, supra note 80.
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this Definition."15 5 Six of the seven specific acts of aggression listed
in article 3 of the Definition deal with actions involving the use of
armed force. 56 Although the acts listed in article 3 are not exhaustive, only the Security Council is empowered to specify other
acts that amount to aggression under the provisions of the Charter.157 The Security Council has not made any determination that
the provision of safe haven for drug traffickers by a foreign head
of state is a culpable act of aggression under general international
law. Pickering's statement seems to advocate an extension of the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention permitting the use of armed
force against other states to protect U.S. nationals within its own
borders from the activities of drug traffickers taking refuge in
other countries. Such an extension of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention would greatly expand the legal limits on recourse to
force and would create another huge loophole to justify illegal
armed intervention. States would have an incentive to rely upon
the activities of drug cartels as a pretext for intervention on other
grounds, just as they have used the protection of nationals abroad
as a pretext for the illegal use of armed force.
No international legal authority exists that permits unilateral
use of force within the geographical territory of another state to
apprehend a person indicted on drug trafficking charges in a foreign country. Remarkably, the U.S. has refused to publicly disclose
the legal grounds upon which it has relied in reaching the conclusion that apprehension of indicted drug traffickers abroad is permissible under international law 158 This refusal may be due to
recognition that the legal justifications concocted by the Justice
Department would fail to withstand the critical gaze of the international legal community
Lacking any credible legal justification for apprehending Nonega, the U.S. action sets an ominous precedent that is contrary
to the U.S. national interest. The logical extension of the U.S.

"I Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 1 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 143,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
56 Id.
"1

Id. at art. 4; Fairley, supra note 51, at 39-40.

' The Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Justice Department has allegedly prepared

three classified legal opimons that try to establish the legality of seizing Nonega for trial in
the U.S. On the basis of information leaked to the press and in congressional testimony,
one commentator has surnmzed that the legal opimons of the Justice Department rely upon
extremely restrictive interpretations of U.S. federal law and lack any basis of support under
international law. See L.A. Times, supra note 72.
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action is the assertion of a right by states to use military force
against other states to seize indicted cnrminals for trial. 59
The U.S. action is also of questionable value in alleviating the
U.S. drug problem. The capture of Noriega will only have a
minimal impact in stemming the influx of drugs into the U.S.
because the demand for drugs has not diminished, and the major
source of most of the cocaine exported to the U.S. is Colombia,
not Panama.
The expressed intent of the Bush Administration to address the
drug problem to ensure the survival of democratic nations is a
worthy goal. Yet, the solution to this problem lies not in unilaterally compromising the sovereign status of other states, an approach which can serve only to threaten the stability of the world
order.
F. Military Action Supported by the DemocraticallyElected
Leaders of Panama
As a final justification for the invasion, the U.S. alleged that
it had consulted with the democratically elected government of
Panama, who welcomed the invasion:
The freely elected leaders of Panama, President Guillermo
Endara and Vice Presidents
Calderon and
Ford, have
assumed the nghtful leadership of their country
It is worth noting that the U.S. Government consulted with
the democratically elected leadership prior to last evemng's actions, and that they approve of our steps.'6°
There is well established precedent in international law legitinuzing military intervention prompted by an express invitation
from the lawful government of a state.' 6' This pnnciple of international law is founded on the notion of consent:

" The U.S. has insisted that Nonega was not seized but rather surrendered voluntarily.
The U.S. also has maintained that Nonega was not arrested until he was on board U.S.
military aircraft. While this is the official U.S. position, privately many U.S. officials do
not dispute that Nonega was coerced into surrendering to American military authorities. It
is also highly arguable that Nonega was arrested when he was taken into custody and
deprived of his liberty pnor to boarding the aircraft. See Lewis, Noriega's Capture Called
Unprecedented by Experts, L.A. Daily Journal, Jan. 15, 1990, at 5, § 1, col. 1.
,60Einaudi, supra note 80.
"I See Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness
of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L 131, 138 (1984).
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If a state consents to an interference within its protected
sphere of interests prior to or simultaneously with the act of
interference, the act can be said to be legitimate by principles of
traditional international law The consenting state exercises its
sovereign right in so doing, and the consent on the other hand
grants the right to the intervening state. In reality this type of
interference cannot be called an intervention, inasmuch as intervention signifies an act or threat of compulsion or coercion of
the will of a state by another, an imposition of the will of the
intervenor. If consent is given freely, there is no imposition of
62

will.1

Although intervemng m support of the legitimate incumbent
government is permissible, no provision allows a state to intervene
on behalf of opposition groups not in control of the state's territory 163 Quincy Wright explains,
The state is an abstract entity and cannot speak except through
its government. Governments come and go, sometimes by constitutional process, sometimes by revolution. It is presumed that a
government in firm possession of the territory of a state, even if
not generally recognized, can speak for the state.
There is a
presumption, on the other hand, that a government, even if
generally recognized, cannot speak for the state if it is not in
firm possession of the state's territory In international law the
de facto situation is presumed to overrule the de jure situationex fact is Jus oritur 164
Applying these general principles to the facts of the U.S. military action in Panama, U.S. reliance upon the consent of the
democratically elected government of Panama is legally suspect.
Although most foreign observers agree that Guillermo Endara won
the presidential election in Panama, Endara never assumed power
because Nonega declared the election null and void.1 65 The Endara
Government was never m firm possession of the territory of Panama prior to the invasion. Additionally, no states recogmzed the
Endara government as the legitimate government of Panama prior

161A. THOmAS, supra note 6, at 91 (footnotes omitted).
M6Schwenmnger, The 1980's: New Doctnnes of Intervention or New Norms of Nonintervention, 33 RuTGERS L. REv. 423, 428 (1981); see Smolowe, supra note 35, at 30.
I" Wnght, Editorial Comment: United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 Am. J.
INT'L L. 112, 120 (1959).
161Smolowe, supra note 35, at 30-31.
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to the invasion.', Endara had no authority to consent to the
invasion. Even if one accepts for purposes of analysis that Endara
was the lawful head of the government of Panama, no invitation
was initiated by him. The Bush administration merely consulted
with the Endara government, which approved the action. This
implies that consent was secured only after the decision to invade
had been made and raises a suspicion as to whether the consent
was given voluntarily without outside inducement.' 67
This justification depends on facts that just do not exist.
IV

THE

ROLE OF THE LAW AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

From early 1988, the U.S. made no attempt to disguise its
objective of forcing Nonega's removal from office. This goal seems
to have been chosen without regard to the law. It is a violation of
both the U.N. and O.A.S. Charters for any country to insist on
the composition of political leadership in another country By
framing the U.S. goal in this manner, nothing short of Nonega's
actual removal from power would have fulfilled the U.S. objective.
Although the law did not shape U.S. objectives, legal considerations initially seem to have played a role in the process by which
the U.S. attempted to secure Nonega's surrender of power. The
U.S. allowed the Grand Jury deliberations over Noriega's drug
trafficking activities to run their course. After drug indictments
were issued, the U.S. negotiated privately with Noriega and through
the representatives of Latin American countries, and encouraged

'11 After the Panamanian invasion, the Security Council deadlocked over the issue of
whether the Endara government or the Nonega government was the legitimate government
of Panama. The Soviet Union, Cuba, and the Security Council's seven nonaligned members
from the developing world refused to recognize the Endara government because it was
brought to power by the unlawful use of force. While refusing to render a firm opinion on
which regime was legitimate, Chief U.N. Legal Counsel Carl-August Fleischuauer implied
that many lawyers viewed Nonega's designated deputy head as having a strong claim for
legitimately addressing the Security Council debate on behalf of Panama. See N.Y. Times,
Dec. 23, 1989, § A, at 15, col. 1.
16, As m other instances, the factual uncertainties surrounding the Bush Admnistration's consultations with Endara make it difficult to assess if consent was voluntarily given
without outside pressure. See, e.g., Faincett, Intervention in InternationalLaw, A Study of
Some Recent Cases, 103 Recueil des Cours 347, 361-63 (1961):
The pnnciple of consent presents difficulties of fact; for it is often hard
to determine. whether intervening forces have come at the invitation or -with
the consent of the lawful government, and whether
consent has been
freely given and is not rather the product of hidden influence or pressure by
the intervening power, which will be often found at work in countries on the
power frontier.

1990-91]

INVASION OF PANAMA

Nonega to step down by offering him asylum in another country.
The U.S. also instituted economic sanctions against Panama and
encouraged other states to do the same for the purpose of facilitating Nonega's departure from power. Since no international consensus exists regarding the legality of using economic sanctions to
bring about political change in a country, an argument could be
made that such a move was not unlawful at least under the U.N.
Charter. As Damrosch points out, the reaction to the U.S. sanctions against Panama suggests a "considerable ambivalence in the
international community about the use of economic sanctions to
affect domestic political trends. ' 168 Although economic sanctions
arguably may not have violated the U.N. Charter, it would be
difficult to make a strong claim that sanctions were not in contravention of the non-intervention principle codified in the O.A.S.
Charter. This may explain why Latin American countries objected
most strenuously to the economic sanctions. Although twenty-two
Latin American states denounced the U.S. move as an intervention
m the internal affairs of Panama, other states did go along with
the U.S. action "by declimng to do business as usual with the
Noriega regime." 16 9
The U.S. also sought to bring about Noriega's removal by
strongly encouraging Panama to hold free and fair elections. Although insisting on the establishment of democracy would violate
article 13 of the O.A.S. Charter, a strong legal argument could be
made that simple encouragement to hold free and fair elections is
consistent with article 3 of the O.A.S. Charter, which identifies
the existence of representative democracy as a condition for fulfilling the aims of the O.A.S. By encouraging free and fair elections, the U.S. was pursuing its objective of securing Noriega's
removal legally This was a shrewd legal techique given Noriega's
rapidly eroding popular support. It was a legal ploy that would
secure the U.S. objective, provided Nonega was willing to accept
the outcome. Nonega's subsequent annulment of the election prevented the U.S. from realizing its goal. Once Nonega refused to
comply with the outcome of the election result, the U.S. was able
to earn the support of the O.A.S., which condemned Nonega's
actions and ins abuses of the electoral process. The O.A.S. was
even willing to label Nonega's conduct a threat to peace and
I Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence
Over Domestic Affairs, 83 Am.J. INT'L L. 1, 33 (1989).
"6

Id. at 34.
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stability in the region. By employing legal means to achieve its
objective, the U.S. was able to gain significant support for its call

that Nonega abide by the election results and relinquish his power.
The O.A.S. censure provided a measure of legitimacy to U.S.
objectives.
Unfortunately, the censure from the O.A.S. was insufficient to
achieve the aim that the U.S. had set for itself. After negotiation,
mediation, econonuc sanctions, democratic elections, and censure

by the O.A.S. failed to achieve the desired result, the U.S. apparently decided that the unilateral use of force in violation of international law was necessary to fulfill its objective.
The law. did not affect the shaping of U.S. objectives in Panama and only influenced the process by which the U.S. sought to
achieve its objectives until the U.S. determined that such achievement necessitated the abandonment of legal techniques. The law
did influence the manner in which the U.S. sought to legitimize its
action. Yet, even mnthis regard, the law affected the articulation
of U.S. justifications less than in previous instances of U.S. involvement in military action in the Americas. Only three of the
U.S. justifications were constructed around commonly accepted or
even recognized principles of law These included the U.S. defense
that its action was necessary to protect its nationals in Panama
pursuant to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The U.S.
also attempted to justify its action under existing treaty obligations
and under the doctrine of intervention by invitation.
The international community has acclimated to efforts by states
to justify forcible military intervention on the basis of existing
treaty obligations or under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The international community also has grown accustomed to
attempts to justify armed intervention pursuant to the well recognized principle in international law of intervention by invitation.
None of these three justifications were able to withstand legal
evaluation even under a generous reading of the facts. As a means
of protecting American nationals in Panama, the American action
did not comply with Sir Humphrey Waldock's permissible parameters within which the customary international law right of selfdefense may be legitimately exercised. The U.S. action can not be
justified as a self-defense measure under the O.A.S. Charter and
was in breach of key provisions of this treaty, such as articles 18
and 20 of the revised O.A.S. Charter, which recognize the terntonal inviolability of a State and contain a blanket prohibition on
intervention including the use of armed force.
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The U.S. claim of a right of military action under the Panama
Canal Treaty to protect the Canal was unsupported by the facts,
which suggested no direct threat to the Canal existed. Even if
threats did exist, it is highly questionable whether the U.S. had the
authority to act unilaterally without Panamanian consent against
internal Panamanian threats to the Canal. The U.S. invasion did
not even conform to previous U.S. interpretations concerning the
boundaries within which any unilateral U.S. action to protect the
Canal must be taken.
The poorly developed legal arguments advanced by the U.S. in
connection with these three recognized legal principles suggest that
the U.S., if unwilling to publicly concede the illegality of the action,
was at least well aware that its ac.ion was not justified from a
legal standpoint. During the course of their training, law students
are frequently advised to argue the facts in a case if the law is not
in favor of their client. 170 The weak legal case for the U.S. action
in Panama may explain why the U.S. chose to emphasize so
strongly the mitigating circumstances preceding the invasion such
as the drug trafficking activities of Noriega, the abuses of human
rights under his regime, and the obstruction of democratic processes in Panama as well as the political ends achieved as a result
of the action.
What distinguishes U.S. efforts to legitimize the invasion of
Panama from other recent military adventures, such as Grenada,
is reliance upon a newly devised theory without precedent in modern history The U.S. insisted its apprehension of Nonega was
permissible. Pickering's vaguely worded statement in the Security
Council that Noriega's activities amounted to aggression against
the U.S. is insufficiently developed to constitute a credible legal
argument and seems to be more of a factual argument. The refusal
of the United States to outline the legal basis for apprehending
Nonega suggests not only that the U.S. realized it possessed no
such right but more importantly that, because of the omnous
precedent such a move would entail, the U.S. does not propose a
change in the law to recognize such a right.17 1 The U.S. approach
of falling to explicitly acknowledge that its defense concerning
110
R.

FisHER, PoiNTs OF CHOICE 70 (1978).

During the Cuban missile crlss, the U.S. did not argue that the naval quarantine
of Cuba was a legally exercisable right under the self-defense provisions of Article 51
because a broader interpretation of the phrase "if an armed attack occurs" would set a
"I

dangerous precedent for the future. Id. at 13.
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Nonega's apprehension is in mitigation of illegality is dangerous.
Members of the international community may be led to believe the
U.S. is proposing a change in the law and act accordingly
Another distinguishing feature of U.S. efforts to legitimize the
invasion of Panama is reliance on a justification that was previously discredited by Latin American leaders after the U.S. military
intervention in the Dominican Republic and that the U.S. admits
has no conceivable basis in law The U.S. conceded it did not
claim a legal right to invade Panama to restore democracy. Nonetheless, the U.S. strongly implied that the invasion must be viewed
in the overall context of the political purpose achieved-namely
the restoration of democracy in Panama.
U.S. focus on drug trafficking activities and interference with
democratic processes in Panama as well as on the restoration of
democracy as a consequence of the U.S. action represents more
than just an attempt to deflect attention away from its unlawful
assertion of power. These circumstances have been offered as mitigating factors designed to prevent or at least weaken censure from
the international community.17 The U.S. thus hoped that its action
could be justified by mitigating factors even though it was unlawful.
Precedent exists in the international community for judging less
harshly or refusing to censure the unlawful use of force where
there are compelling mitigating circumstances. During the Security
Council debates on the Israeli raid on Entebbe, several states flatly
refused to temper their judgment of any unlawful action regardless
of the circumstances precipitating the action. 73 Other states were
willing to consider the mitigating circumstances giving rise to the
action and the purpose of the action in deciding, if not the legality
of the action, then at least the extent, if any, to which the action
should be censured. For example, Sweden took the position that
the Israeli raid on Entebbe was a violation of the U.N. Charter
but refused to condemn the action given the extenuating circumstances. As the Swedish Representative to the U.N. Security Council explained,
[Article 2(4)] seeks to protect a right which all peoples find basic:
the right to live in peace in their own land.
"12 This bears some resemblance to criminal law, in which sentencing of a guilty
individual by the court may take into account the context and purpose of the unlawful act.
173 See supra notes 56, 59-60 and accompanying text.
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The Charter does not authorize any exception to this rule
except for the right of self-defence and enforcement measures
undertaken by the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.
This is no coincidence or oversight. Any formal exceptions permitting the use of force or of military intervention in order to
achieve certain aims, however laudable, would be bound to be
abused, especially by the big and strong, and to pose a threat,
especially to the small and weak.
In our view, the Israeli action which we are now considenng
involved an infringement of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Uganda. We understand the strong reactions
against this action, which cost the lives of many Ugandan citizens
and led to heavy material damage. At the same time, we are
aware of the terrible pressures to which the Israeli Government
and people were subjected, faced with this unprecedented act of
international piracy and viewing the increasing threat to the lives
of so many of their compatriots.
The problem with which we are faced is thus many-faceted.
My Government, while unable to reconcile the Israeli action with
the strict rules of the Charter, 174
does not find it possible to join
in a condemnation m this case.
To fully assess the success of U.S. efforts to escape censure
from the international community is difficult because alliance patterns can affect voting on U.N. resolutions and frequently produce
fudged political statements of compromise in explanation of votes
against or abstentions on U.N. resolutions condemning unlawful
armed action. Forty states abstained and twenty voted against the
General Assembly resolution strongly condemning the U.S. action.
The explanations of some states that voted against the General
Assembly resolution suggest that the circumstances in Panama

114U.N. Doc. S/PV 1939, supra note 60, at 14. Other states, such as the U.S. and
Israel asserted that a legal right existed to protect one's endangered nationals in the territory
of another State when the latter proved unable to ensure such protection. While not explicitly
stating that such a right existed, the French Representative to the U.N. Security Council
stated that the circumstances leading to the Entebbe raid could affect the judgment of the

action:
[T]here would not seem to be any doubt that the surpnse attack by an
armed force on a foreign airport for the purpose of achieving an objective by
violence indeed constituted a violation of international law. However, in order
to make an objective judgement, we should take into account the circumstances
that led up to this action. Obviously, the incident would not have taken place
if there had not been beforehand an unlawful threat to the lives and security
of innocent persons.
31 U.N. SCOR (1943rd mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV 1943 (1976).
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preceding the invasion affected their refusal to support U.N. condemnations of the action. Italy, Turkey, New Zealand, Singapore,
and France neither asserted nor denied that the U.S. action violated
international law. They simply expressed their opposition to armed
intervention and internal interference in States, implying that the
U.S. action was an example of both. At the same time, all of these
countnes refused to support the General Assembly resolution because it was too unbalanced since it did not reflect the drugtrafficking activities in Panama and the lack of respect for democratic procedures under Noriega. 175 This suggests that the U.S.
effort to mute the reaction of the international community was
effective as to at least a few states.
The U.S. attempt to limit harsh censure from the international
community was less successful than it might otherwise have been
for several reasons. First, the mitigating circumstances preceding
the invasion were not very compelling. In the Entebbe case, international terrorists had hijacked a plane and held several hundred
innocent hostages. These facts provided more compelling grounds
for launching military action. Not only were U.S. nationals not in
imminent danger in Panama, but the drug trafficking activities and
obstruction of democratic processes in Panama posed no imminent
threat to U.S. nationals. Secondly, as in a criminal court considering sentencing, the context in which the action was committed
must be considered along with the factors that motivated the action
and the purpose of the action. In the Entebbe case, the Israeli raid
was a direct product of an unlawful threat to the lives of innocent
persons. In the case of Panama, the drug trafficking activities of
Nonega were certainly deplorable. Although the byproduct of the
U.S. action may have been to halt tyranny in Panama, the undisguised goal of the U.S. from the outset of the two year standoff
with Noriega never changed-securing Ins removal. From the facts
currently available, the U.S. invasion clearly was intended and
undertaken to change the existing governmental leadership in Panama. This motive may not have presented a problem for the U.S.
in persuading other countries to accept its action or at least not to
condemn it if other purposes existed for which a persuasive legal
argument could be presented. In this case no such claim could be
made. Moreover, reliance upon the restoration of democracy in
Panama as justification for the action may have been viewed

17sSee U.N. Doc. 7976, supra note 73.
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skeptically by members of the international community because the
U.S. has in the past tolerated a number of dictatorships in Panama,
including Noriega himself, who enjoyed strong U.S. support until
his sentiments turned anti-American. The focus on Nonega's drug
trafficking activities may not have been very influential in persuading countries to temper their judgment of the U.S. action since the
available evidence indicates that the U.S. was aware of Nonega's
activities for years and remained conspicuously silent.
Viewed from an historical perspective, the law has played a
lesser role in U.S. actions in Panama than in the Cuban, Dominican
Republic, and Grenadan cases. The law most obviously affected
the shaping of U.S. goals and acted as a constraint on those goals
during the Cuban missile cnsis. 176 While it is less clear to what
extent, if any, the law affected the framing of U.S. objectives in
the Dominican Republic and Grenadan cases, the selection of U.S.
objectives in Panama was clearly made without regard to the law
In all four instances, the law did play a role in the means
employed by the U.S. to secure its objectives. In the Cuban missile
crisis, the U.S. bestowed an air of legality to its military action by
characterizing it as a defensive measure commissioned by the O.A.S.
The U.S. employed this legal technique in the Dominican Republic
with some success by undertaking the action in conjunction with
O.A.S. members and labelling it as an O.A.S. peacekeeping move.'"
16 Dunng the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. wanted to thwart Soviet influence
in Cuba and to force the removal of Castro. Yet, U.S. policymakers recognized that the
U.S. could not lawfully insist that Cuba cut its ties with the Soviet Union or that Castro
abdicate is position of power. For this reason, the U.S. articulated narrower objectives
for which strong legal arguments could be presented and pursued these objectives through
legal techniques. This was accomplished in part by imposing a defensive naval quarantine
of Cuba under the auspices of the O.A.S. for the purpose of facilitating the removal of
Soviet rmissiles from Cuba. The law thus had a restraimng influence on the shaping of U.S.
goals. A. CHAYFs, Tam CuN MissmE Cisis 30-40 (1974).
17 In 1965, the U.S. intervened militarily in the Dominican Republic. A coup d'etat
had removed the President of the Domimcan Republic, a right wing military dictator, and
replaced him with a civilian junta. Military forces sympathetic to the ousted President
attempted to overthrow the rebel leader. A military draw ensued and law and order could
no longer be maintained. Many viewed the U.S. military action m the Dominican Republic
as one aimed chiefly at influencing the course of the rebellion to squelch the potential threat
of communism resulting from the victory of a commumst-led revolutionary movement. The
U.S. advanced several justifications for the action, including two for which a strong legal
claim could be made. The U.S. stated that the action was necessary to protect its nationals
and the nationals of other countries in the Dominican Republic. The U.S. also described
the action as an O.A.S. peacekeeping move. By employing legal procedures available to it
through the O.A.S., the U.S. was able to strengthen support for its action. A slim majority
of O.A.S. members supported the military action as a peacekeeping move. See Lillich, supra
note 53, at 341-44.
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The U.S. described its military action in Grenada as a measure
commissioned by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
[hereinafter O.E.C.S.]. This legal tactic failed to enhance support
for the action in part because the O.E.C.S. was long considered a
moribund regional collective security alliance. 17 8 The U.S. employed
legal techniques to achieve its objective in Panama, the most effective of which was the encouragement of democratic elections.
After Noriega agreed to hold the elections and then refused to
comply with the results, the O.A.S. strongly condemned Nonega's
abuses of the electonal process and requested him to abide by the
election results. This was as far as the O.A.S. was willing to go in
supporting the U.S. objective of securing Noriega's departure from
power. Unlike the military actions in Cuba and the Dominican
Republic, the U.S. was unable to provide a measure of legitimacy
to its action in Panama by undertaking it in concert with the
O.A.S. 179 Thus, whereas the law continuously affected the process
by which the U.S. tried to achieve its objectives in the Cuban,
Dominican Republic, and Grenadan cases, legal techniques were
abandoned by the U.S. once a determination was made that Nonega's removal necessitated recourse to force, an action the O.A.S.
was apparently unwilling to countenance.
Since legal techniques were ultimately abandoned by the U.S.,
it is not surprising that the law assumed a lower profile in the
manner in which the U.S. tried to legitimize its action than it did
in the previous instances of U.S. involvement in military action m
the Americas. The U.S. presented poorly developed legal arguments
in what seems to have been a half-hearted attempt to justify its
action legally U.S. policymakers probably realized that the invasion of Panama would be unable to withstand legal scrutiny in the
international community This may account for the strong emphasis
178The U.S. also sought to justify the Grenada action as a measure necessary to protect

U.S. nationals in Grenada and as an intervention prompted by an invitation from the lawful
governmental authority in Grenada. Joyner, supra note 161, at 134-39; see also Boyle,
Chayes, Dore, Falk, Feinider, Ferguson, Jr., Fine, Nunes, Westen, InternationalLawlessness in Grenada, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 172-73 (1984). Other factors also may account
for the difference in international support for the Domnican Republic and Grenadan action.

The international community may have become more sensitive in the intervening eighteen
years to attempts by states to sueld an unlawful assertion of power by clothing it m legal
garb. Also, the environment in the Dominican Republic preceding the U.S. action arguably

represented a greater danger to foreign nationals than the situation that existed prior to the
U.S. action in Grenada. The U.S. could more credibly rely on the need to protect foreign

nationals in the Dominican Republic as a legal justification for the action.
279 See A Hemisphere Feels Invaded, L.A. Times, Dec. 23, 1989, § B, at 6, col. 3.
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placed on the context in which the unlawful action was committed.
The U.S. may have hoped either that its action could be justified
by the mitigating circumstances or that these factors would at a
nummum temper the response of the international community to
its unlawful assertion of power.
Wider lessons can be learned from U.S. actions in Panama.
Preventative measures could have resulted in greater international
support for U.S. actions against Panama. The evidence available
indicates that the U.S. was well aware of Nonega's drug-trafficking
activities for years prior to the crisis. The U.S. continued to support
him despite this knowledge because of his pro-American activities
and connections with the C.I.A. If the U.S. had exposed his illegal
activities years ago, subsequent U.S. efforts to persuade the international community to condemn Noriega's activities mght have
been more persuasive. In addition, the eventual unlawful assertion
of power by the U.S. could have been avoided if the U.S. chose
goals to which it was legally entitled. 18 0 If the U.S. had formulated
as its key objective exposing the drug-trafficking activities of Nonega, the abuses of human rights under is regime, and the denial
of democratic processes, the U.S. would have been able to achieve
these goals without resorting to force. Instead of presenting a
dispassionate appraisal of these facts, U.S. officials insisted on
Nonega's removal and expended an inordinate amount of energy
in launching personal attacks against Norlega. As Fisher advises,
"Tihe best advocacy does not contend that one's opponent is an
evil idiot with nothing to be said for him. Such arguments carry
little weight to neutrals, who suspect that there must be something
to be said for both sides, and carry no weight to adversaries."'8 1
If the U.S. had stuck to narrower objectives for which a strong
legal claim would be presented or even if the U.S. continued to
use legal techniques to bring about Nonega's downfall, 8 2 it is
entirely possible that Noriega eventually would have been witness
to his own undoing. The election results in Panama reflected a
widespread lack of popular support. With sanctions increasingly

11See R.

FisHER, supra note 170, at 51.

"I Id. at 70.
12 Fisher persuasively reasons that "a strong case can be made for reconciling the
pursuit of victory with the pursuit of peace by trying to win, but only by lawful means.
Law thus offers one strategy for pursuing these two goals simultaneously: As you try to
win, accept the rules of law as constraints on your behavior. "Acting as a restraint, law
does not preclude a government from trying very hard to win; it simply limits the means
employed." Id. at 78, 84.
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strangling the Panamanian economy, Nonega's popularity was
dwindling at a rapid rate. The collapse of commumsm throughout
Eastern Europe attests to the inability of regimes to govern indefinitely absent popular consent.
CONCLUSION

While U.S. failure to comply with the rules regulating the use
of force threatens the development of a strong international legal
order, it does not negate the legally binding character of these
rules. Although there have been many armed conflicts since World
War II, the majority of states act in accordance with the rule
outlawing unilateral recourse to force most of the time.8 3 Also, in
trying to establish the legitimacy of its actions on the basis of
factual assumptions that fall within the law, the U.S. effectively
recogmzes the authority of the law. As James Barros accurately
observes,
The establishment of international norms is important in governing inter-state relations. These legal norms are rights which states
recognize exist, which they invoke, and which they admit they
are obligated to serve. Their violation does not erase them anymore than an individual can erase municipal law by violating it.
Indeed, like the individuals who violate municipal law, states do
not claim they are above the law They may defend their acts in
various ways, but never on the grounds that international law
does not exist or that it is not binding on them.184
On the other hand, states pursuing a course of unilateral military intervention gradually widen the gap between the rules regulating the use of force and the actual practice of states." 5 If enough
states resort to unilateral military intervention, eventually a credibility gap emerges that weakens efforts to strengthen world order
and thereby fails to enhance or maintain international peace and
security, the principal aim of the United Nations. Determinations
to use force form an integral part of the law shaping process in
that judgments as to whether subsequent actions will be tolerated

" See L. HImN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FoREIGN POLICY 138-39, 146-53
(1979); Dainrosch, supra note 168, at 1-2.
114 J. BARRos, INTRODUCTION, in THE UNITED NATIONS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

1, 10 (1972).
I" See Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J.
17 (1972).
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are impacted. 8 6 Tins is especially the case when a major superpower
resorts to force. As Falk has stated,
An opportunistic use of legal argument by a state so conservative and powerful as the U.S. sets a tone for international life
that is bound to influence the overall prospects for strengthening
the law habit among
[other international actors]."
A classic example of tins can be seen in the Soviet Union's
handling of events in Lithuania. After the Soviet Union raided a
hospital providing sanctuary to Lithuanian army deserters, Sweden
said Moscow's handling of the situation compared favorably with
United States actions m Panama. In defending ins country's actions
m Lithuania, General Secretary Gorbachev stated that the U.S.
would have resolved the impasse in twenty-four hours, referring to
the invasion of Panama.1 88
The unlawful U.S. action in Panama can serve only to tarnish
the reputation of the U.S. as a law-abiding nation and diminish
its ability to affect international affairs m the future. As Fisher
correctly observes,
One means of maintaining and increasing the power of a
state to influence others is to increase the degree to winch law
operates as a constraint on the means used in the pursuit of shortterm victones.189
In the final analysis, the U.S. cannot have its cake and eat it
too. In resorting to unilateral military intervention, the U.S. cannot
ultimately remain unscathed no matter how much it insists on
being the final arbiter of its own actions under international law
and regardless of the efforts undertaken to avoid community judgments. Schachter explains that appraisals of the legality of state
conduct, "especially in regard to the use of armed force, are made
in a variety of nonjudicial contexts and that, in the end, no state

See Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (1989):
"Legality matters[,]
not only as rhetoric to win support, but also as

a factor to be taken into account as part of the effort to contain violence and
reduce risks of escalation." Id. at 266 (footnote omitted). "Most governments

are aware of the implications for other conflicts.

"

Id.
Falk, U.S. Naval War College InternationalLaw Studies 62, 65 (1947-1977).
Iu Remarks of Gorbachev at Joint Ottawa Press Conference with Canadian Prime
Mimster Brian Mulroney, Soviet-Canadian Summit (1990).
18

"'

R. FIsMR, supra note 170, at 53.
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is actually the sole judge of its own cause when it claims to have
used force in self-defense."' 190
As Schachter explains,
To be sure, a nonbinding condemnation or rebuke does not have
the enforceability of a judicial decision in a national court. But
that is not to say that such critical judgments are without effect.

Censure carries with it political costs. Those costs are not trivial,
as shown by the intense efforts of governments to avoid censure
and to demonstrate the legitimacy of their conduct. 191
The U.S. has undermined the rules regulating the use of force
that it assisted in drafting after World War II to foster a stable
world order. As Hoyt has pointed out,
American [foreign] policy has swung back and forth
between defending the U.N. rules against the use of force and
192
undernming them.
The U.S. cannot credibly insist that other countries abide unequivocally by the rules outlawing armed force when it is prepared
to distort the permissible parameters of, and effectively subvert,
those same rules.
Stripped of its legal cover, the U.S. invasion of Panama amounts
to no more and no less than a naked display of misperceived shortterm self-interest designed to maintain the U.S. sphere of influence
in the Western hemisphere. Glaringly compromised by this action
is the U.S. national interest in maintaimng the rules of coexistence
necessary to ensure survival. 19 Since the use of force can perilously
escalate to global catastrophe in the nuclear age, national interest
in avoiding conflict is self-evident. i1 The rules regulating the use
of force overlap and reflect national interest, both short and longterm. This proposition holds especially true for the U.S. As one
of the architects of the new international legal order, the rules are
heavily tipped in favor of the U.S. as a "status quo power." It is
invariably in the U.S. interest to adhere unequivocally to the rules
of international law

'1

See Schachter, supra note 63, at 119-22, 131-32.

191Id. at 146.
19 E. HoYr, supra note 7, at 1.
193See

THE

Schachter, supra note 63, at 146.
See A. EmE, Outlawing the Use of Force: The Efforts by the United Nations, in
UNrrED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 99,

113 (1987).
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Adherence to the rules of international law is consistent with
the national security interests of the United States, whether considered expansively in terms of furthering world public order or
parochially m terms .of satisfying selfish goals. The classic Machiavellian dichotomy between the "is" and the "ought to be" does
not hold true for American foreign policy The expedient and the
just comcide and reinforce each other. This situation exists because the United States is the outstanding example of a status
quo power. Consequently, American national interests include
respect for international law by the United States and other
governments. Such conformity encourages the peaceful preservation of the political, economic and military status quo heavily
weighted to America's advantage. Phenomenologically, law is the
instrument par excellence for the peaceful preservation and transformation of any political or economic status quo. By its very
nature, the international legal order represents an attempt by
advantaged international actors to legitimate and consolidate existing and proposed power relations.
When major status quo
powers threaten or use force for reasons not explicitly sanctioned
by contemporary standards of international law, formally accepted by all states in the world community, they undermine the
integrity of the very international legal order that they constructed
to protect their vital national interests. Consequently, those states
that currently benefit the most from the existing arrangement of
international relations should not unwittingly lose them by resorting to, or encouraging, illegitimate violence and coer-

cion.

195

The U.S. action in Panama is utterly out of sync with the post
Cold War era. As a result of Gorbachev's new thinking policy of
"Perestroika" in the international arena, the Soviet Union has
highlighted the need to abandon the traditional notions of ideological confrontation between the East and West.' 96 The Soviets have

M9Boyle, InternationalLaw as a Basis for Conducting American Foreign Policy, 8
YALE J. WoanD PuB. ORDER 107-109 (1981).

1" In a report to the Soviet Commumst Party Central Committee's Plenary Meeting
in February 1990 on the Draft of the 28th Party Congress, Gorbachev spoke frankly about
the need to abandon the traditional notions of confrontation:
"The platform states clearly what we should abandon. We should abandon the ideological dogmatism that became ingrained in past decades
outmoded views of the world revolutionary process and world development as
a whole.
We should abandon everything that led to the isolation of socialist
countries from the mainstream of world civilization. We should abandon the
understanding of progress as a permanent confrontation with a socially dif-
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exhibited a renewed interest in the U.N. as a means of strengthening the international legal order197 and have stressed the need for
uneqmvocal adherence to the international rules regulating the use
of force. 19 Recogmzing the discrepancy between words and deeds,
the Soviets withdrew their forces from Afghanistan and acknowl-

edged the violation of international law that action entailed:
If we want to be a part of the civilized world, we must take
account of how our words and deeds are perceived.
Perestroika . [consists] in preventing discrepancies between
words and deeds and in modifying the style and methods of our
work.
The new political thinking has given us a new scale of values

ferent world."
Gorbachev, The Report to the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's Plenary
Meeting on the Draft of the 28th Party Congress (Feb. 5, 1990), reprintedby Novosti Press
Agency, Moscow (1990).
'1 The Soviets have urged greater reliance on the U.N. and have agreed to pay arrears
to the U.N. for programs which that country previously refused to support:
the importance of the role of the U.N. I am
I would like to stress
convinced that the revival of its role and peacemaking functions is a major
step towards peace in human Istory.
Excerpts from Address by Gorbachev (Mar. 15, 1990) reprinted by Novosti Press Agency,
Moscow 15 (1990). The present Soviet posture with regard to the U.N. represents a
phenomenal change in Soviet attitude toward that organization. Hazard states that the U.N.
was previously regarded as a "potential capitalist cabal which must be watched warily
whenever it acted." The renewed interest in the U.N., according to the Soviets, is based on
the current belief in the supremacy of general human values over class, ideological, and
other interests:
"[F]aith in the U.N. organization is being revived. Among the reasons
behind this revival is that useless arguments on the advantages of one social
system or set of ideological values over another has been abandoned. Such
arguments only led to confrontation and served to distract the attention and
efforts of this international orgamzation away from the necessity of ensuring
stable and decent living conditions for millions of people."
S. LAvROv, Naw TmKiuNo AND SocI A PROoanss 40 (1990); see also Butler, International
Law, Foreign Policy and the Gorbachev Style, 42 J. INT'L An'. 363, 370-74 (1989); Hazard,
The Gorbachev Era in the U.S.S.R.. The Best and Worst of Times, 15 SYAcusE J. INT'L
L. & CoM. 1, 10 (1988).

MsSuggesting unequivocal adherence to the general international rules regulating the
use of force with regard to both the capitalist and socialist states is novel in Soviet
international legal theory. Tis suggestion, coupled with Gorbachev's demonstrated willingness to let Eastern European countries charter their own destimes, constitutes an implicit
renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine under which the Soviets previously asserted a right
and duty to render military assistance to other socialist countries under threat. It also
implicitly signals an acknowledgment that the Brezhnev Doctrine was contradictory to
general international law.
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and new criteria for our conduct. We have declared that we will

be guided by umversal human values. These are no vague abstractions: they exist, and they cannot be interpreted in an arbitrary

or selective way
There are umversally recognized instruments to give us our

bearings, mainly the United Nations Charter, and the declarations, covenants, conventions and resolutions ratified and observed by most of the world's countries.
For years, over a hundred United Nations members condemned one Soviet action [the invasion of Afghanistan]. What
more did we need to see that we were at odds with the world
community, violating international norms and universal human
interests?
The United Nations Charter recogmzes the right to individual
and collective defence and the right to give military aid to other
countries. Yet it severely restricts such actions and calls for using
non-military methods, the good offices of the United Nations
and other means of political settlement as far as possible.
As we make major changes in our approach to international
relations, we have to take into consideration the existing system
of mutual obligations.
The observation of treaties, agreements and contracts is one
of the fundamental principles of international law 199
The U.S.S.R. may have come to appreciate that compliance
with international law serves both its short-term and long-term
national interests.1 Although the U.S. recognizes the authority of
the law, the U.S invasion of Panama demonstrates that the inter-

'" Excerpts of Address by Shevardnadze (Oct. 23, 1989) reprintedin FoREIGN PoLIcY
40 (1989).
= Despite Gorbachev's bold new tlunking policy, unanswered questions still linger in
the international community. Is new Soviet thinking a sincere attempt to strengthen the
international legal order, a tactical maneuver designed to lower international tension to
permit the U.S.S.R. to focus its attention and financial resources on restructunng a severely
ailing economy, or both? Only time will provide the answer to these questions. The coming
months and years will demonstrate whether Gorbachev's unparalleled proposal to establish
the pnmacy of international law over national policy is truly revolutionary or just a passing
fancy in Soviet international legal theory and practice. In the interim, the international
community should not be dissuaded from cautiously applauding Gorbachev's new thinking
policies while at the same time continuing to judge his policy of perestroika, as Shevardnadze
suggests, according to deeds rather than just words. See Qmgley, Perestroikaand International Law, 82 AmER. J. INT'L L. 788, 789-91 (1988); Rogers, Jr., Glasnost and Perestroika:
An Evaluation of the Gorbachev Revolution and Its Opportunitiesfor the West, 16 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 209, 211-14, 240-41 (1988).
AND PESTROIKA
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national rules regulating the use of force in reality merely influence,
rather than reign supreme over, national policy. As the U.S.S.R.
at least recently has increasingly recognized the necessity of complying with the international rules regulating the use of force, the
U.S. has in Panama nusgudedly abandoned the law in shaping its
goals in international affairs and ultimately in the means used to
achieve those goals.
The ability of the U.N. to achieve its primary goal of maintaimng peace and security has been impaired in part by East-West
superpower conflict and the resulting ideological division that m
virtually all instances paralyzed the U.N. Security Council. Gorbachev's new thinking policy of Perestroika offers the U.S. a
golden opportunity to reinvigorate the United Nations so that it
can more fully realize its noble aspiration of maintaining a umversal order in which nations can live peacefully within their borders
to save succeeding generations from the "scourge of war."
The U.S. would be wise to embrace by deeds and not just
words the challenges presented by Gorbachev's bold new thinking
policy The U.S. should cease distorting and circumventing the
rules regulating the use of force and rely upon these rules as the
sole guide for the shaping of U.S. objectives in the Americas and
the process by which the U.S. seeks to achieve those objectives. 201

20

R. FisEaR, supra note 170, at 53.

